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Biodiversity Prospecting: Fulfilling
the Mandate of the Biodiversity
Convention
EdgarJ. Asebey*
Jill D. Kempenaa"
ABSTRACT

After a brief overview of biodiversity prospecting, the
authors review the historical context of biodiversity
prospecting, including the common heritage doctrine,
international patent law, and the Biodiversity Convention.
The authors analyze the four major United States prospecting
initiatives to date and identify their strengths and
shortcomings. The authors then investigate two possible
alternatives: (1) biological resource cartelization and (2) the
development of a new type of biodiversity enterprise. The
authors advocate the latter as a means of complying with the
Biodiversity Convention.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the three years since the signing of the United Nations
Convention on Biological Diversity,' biodiversity prospecting2 has
been hailed as a possible means of furthering the conservation
and development objectives of the Convention. The private sector,
as well as the international development and conservation
communities, has initiated numerous programs that attempt to
support the Convention's objectives. For the developed countries
of the North3 to continue to have access to the developing world's
biological diversity, the Convention calls for (i) active support for

1.
Opened for signature, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force
Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention or Convention].
2.
Biodiversity prospecting, or bioprospecting, is the intensive search for
useful compounds from natural sources. For the purposes of this Article, it
excludes the search for economically important genomes (the genes introduced

from the wild into high-yield agricultural crops).

Bioprospecting in the Information Age:

Ignacio H. Chapela,

Critical Analysis of Pharmaceutical

Searches through Biodiversity 4 (April 13, 1994) (unpublished paper, on file with
the author). Biodiversity prospecting has also been defined as "the search
through biodiversity resources for active compounds for pharmaceutical
development.. . ." Julie M. Feinsilver, Biodiversity Prospecting: Prospects and
Realities, in PROSPECTS INBIODIVERSIY PROSPECTING 21, 21 (A.H. Zakri ed., 1995).
3.
Industrialized nations, long named "First World" or "developed"
nations, are lately referred to as "the North." Underdeveloped nations, earlier
called "Third World" nations, "developing" countries, or "LDCs" (Lesser Developed
Countries), are lately referred to as "the South.' This Article uses the labels
interchangeably. See Roger D. Hanson, North-South Policy: What's the Problem?,
FOREIGN AFF. 1104, 1104-05 (1980) (discussing the accuracy of North-South
distinctions).
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conservation efforts, (ii) equitable compensation to the source
country 4 and its indigenous populations, (iii) technology transfer
to the source country, and (iv) support for capacity-building
within the source country. 5 With no consensus regarding how
best to fulfill these objectives, the projects initiated in the past
three years have varied in scope and effectiveness.
This paper describes recent experiences in biodiversity
prospecting, examines the traditional roles of the North and
South, and proposes how these roles may change to better fulfill
the objectives of the Convention. Part II examines the rationale
behind biodiversity prospecting. Part III looks at the legislative
framework surrounding genetic resources, including (i) the

Common Heritage Doctrine, (ii) patent laws, and (iii) the United
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. Part IV presents and
critically analyzes four biodiversity prospecting projects: (i) the
National Cancer Institute's Natural Products Program, which is
funded by the U.S. government, (ii) the INBio-Merck 6 bilateral
agreement for access to Costa Rica's biodiversity, funded by
Merck and several foundations, (iii) the International Cooperative
Biodiversity Groups, a NIH/USAID/NSF 7 funded initiative, and
(iv) Shaman Pharmaceuticals, a venture capital and public market
funded attempt to use indigenous knowledge from around the
world to discover new drugs. Part V studies the possibility of
cartelization of genetic resources by developing countries. Part VI
describes a new bioprospecting initiative that may be better suited
to fulfilling the objectives of the Biodiversity Convention. Finally,
some general conclusions are drawn in Part VII.

II.

BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING

Dr. Norman Farnsworth, a renowned pharmacognacist,
estimates that eighty percent of the world's population depends
on botanical resources for their primary health care needs. 8 In
contrast, the North is highly dependent upon pre-processed
Of those pharmaceuticals
pharmaceutical compositions.

4.

The term "source countries" refers to countries of the South that are

sources of biological material for multinational pharmaceutical corporations
based in countries of the North.
5.

Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1, 8, 15, 16, 17, 19.

6.
The National Biodiversity Institutes (INBio) and Merck & Co.
7.
National Institutes of Health/U.S. Agency for International
Development/National Science Foundation.
8.

Norman R. Farnsworth, How Can the Well Be Dry When It Is Filled with

Water?, 38(1) ECON. BOTANY 4, 6 (1984).
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currently sold in the United States, it is estimated that up to
twenty-five percent are either derived from or had their origins in
plants. 9
For centuries, societies throughout the world have
recognized the tremendous value of medicinal plants.
The process of identifying useful plants is thought to have
evolved through trial and error.1 0 Throughout the developing
world, knowledge of a plant's usefulness has usually been
empirical. The users could not identify the active compounds
responsible for a specific pharmacological effect, but they did
know that the plant had a specific beneficial effect.
Biodiversity prospecting, or natural products drug discovery
(NPDD), as it is practiced today, is the search for bioactive
compounds contained in natural sources such as plants, fungi,

insects, microbes, and marine organisms. For several decades, it
was believed that NPDD could be replaced by the synthetic
creation of new compounds. In recent years, however, it has
become clear that natural products remain a crucial starting
point for drug discovery. Dr. Gordon Cragg, chief of the National
Cancer Institute's Natural Products Branch, describes the
relationship between rational drug design and natural product as
follows:
although a chemist can synthetically modify and
improve a molecule, "no chemist can 'dream up' the complex
bioactive molecules produced by nature." 11 This is essentially the
rationale for biodiversity prospecting.
Today, the screening process used to evaluate a plant
gathered from a source country generally requires about 500
grams of plant material.
The sample undergoes an organic
extraction using ethanol and then an aqueous (water) extraction.
The extract is then presented to a progression of whole-cell,
receptor, or enzyme tests to determine whether bioactivity exists.
In whole-cell assays, bioactivity is determined by examining the
types and rates of cells that the plant material kills. Those kill
rates guide scientists in determining the material's usefulness
and commercial viability. Extensive clinical trials in both live
animals and humans are typically conducted before a drug is sold
publicly. In the United States, drugs must undergo the Food and
Drug Administration's lengthy approval process.
In light of the Biodiversity Convention, biodiversity
prospecting has been touted, inter alia, as an incentive for
conservation, the means for discovering the next AIDS or cancer
cure, and a vehicle for sustainable economic development. While

9.
Id. at 6.
10.
For a fascinating alternative theory, see WADE DAVIS, SHADOWS IN THE
SUN 127-39 (1992).
11.
Feinsilver, supra note 2, at 22.
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there are clearly potential benefits to biodiversity prospecting,
12
there are also potential dangers. Because almost all screening
facilities are located in the developed world,' 3 the benefits (often
in the form of royalties) from discoveries of novel bioactive
compounds may never return to the source country. In addition,
the identification of a valuable plant may create such a
tremendous demand that expansive harvesting leads to
extinction.
The Biodiversity Convention is a framework that may serve as
a guide to future biodiversity prospectors so that the potential
dangers inherent in the industry may be avoided. While Northern
corporations involved in biodiversity prospecting activities seek
adequate protection of their investments, indigenous groups and
local communities in the South seek to protect their ways of life.
The Convention is a document that can positively impact both of
these divergent interests.

III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Throughout recent history, a variety of conceptual
frameworks have been used to regulate the access and trade of
This section examines the three most
genetic resources.
important of these frameworks: the common heritage doctrine,
international patent law, and the United Nations Convention on
Biological Diversity. This section describes these approaches in
chronological order and highlights their respective strengths and
shortcomings.
A. InitialAssumption: Common HeritageDoctrine
The common heritage doctrine proposes that plant genetic
resources are the common heritage of humankind and therefore
should be freely available to all. This idea dominated the global
approach to genetic resources until very recently.
At the 1983
on Plant
Genetic
Resources,
International
Undertaking
developing countries still argued that "plant genetic resources are
a heritage of humankind to be preserved, and to be freely
available for use, for the benefit of present and future

12.
"Screening" refers to the testing of extracts or mixtures of synthetic
compounds to determine if they contain certain bioactive compounds that may be
purified and developed into pharmaceutical products.
13.
Paul Gormley, Compulsory Patent Licenses and Environmental
Protection,7 TUL. ENVrL. L.J. 131, 137 (1993).
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generations." 14
Although the International Undertaking was
signed by developed countries, it was signed subject to
reservations, which vitiated its essential purpose. 15
It soon became clear the "common heritage" argument could
be used to hurt developing countries' interests.
Using the
common heritage argument as its basis for access, a Northern
pharmaceutical company created a tremendously lucrative drug
from the rosy periwinkle, found in a highly threatened ecosystem
in Madagascar. 16 None of the profits from the new drug, however,
were returned to the source country where they could have helped
17
to conserve the threatened ecosystem.
Developing countries were quick to realize that common
heritage language frequently protected the interests of developed
nations over the interests of developing countries. 18 Recognizing
all genetic lines as the common genetic heritage of humankind left
developed nations in a superior financial and scientific position to
take advantage of a large and easily accessible gene pool. 19 The
industrialized North's treatment of source country resources often
amounted to a new form of colonialism. Developing countries'
resources were used to add value to developed economies without

compensating developing countries. 20

Today, source countries

14.
Report of the Conference of the FAO, U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization, 22d Sess., U.N. Doc. C/83/Rep. (1983).
15.
Michael D. Coughlin, Note, Using the Merck-lNBio Agreement to Clarify
the Convention on BiologicalDiversity, 31 COIUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 348 (1993).
16.
Shaya Kadidal, Note, Plants,Poverty, and PharmaceuticalPatents, 103
YALE L.J. 223, 223 (1993).
17.
Steven M. Rubin & Standwood C. Fish, Biodiversity Prospecting: Using
Innovative ContractualProvisions to Foster EthnobotanicalKnowledge, Technology,
and Conservation, 5 COLO. J. INT'L L. & POLY 23, 27 (1994). It should be noted
that other facets of the rosy periwinkle example are atypical of biodiversity
prospecting. In fact, several facets of the rosy periwinkle make it a poor
paradigm. First, it is a pan-tropical common weed. Second, it is neither rare nor
endangered. Third, the ethnobotanical leads came from countries (Jamaica and
the Philippines) other than the country in which the plant was collected
(Madagascar). See A.B. Cunningham, Conservation, Knowledge and New Natural
Products Development: Partnership or Piracy? 6 (June 1993) (unpublished
paper, on file with the author).
18.
See David R. Downes, New Diplomacy for the Biodiversity Trade:
Biodiversity, Biotechnology, and Intellectual Property in the Convention on Biological
Diversity, 4 TOURO J. TRANSNATL L. 1, 6 (1993) (briefly discussing the changed use
of the common heritage argument).
19.
Kadidal, supranote 16, at 229.
20.
See Jose de Souza Silva, From Medicinal Plants to Natural
Pharmaceuticals: the Commodification of Nature 3 (Apr. 1994) (unpublished
paper, on file with the author) (referring to the "continuous interest of industrial
capitalism in extending the reach of the commodity logic and private property into
the resources of biodiversity").

19951

BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING

reject the common heritage framework. 2 1 Thus, the challenge has
been to formulate an alternate conceptualization of rights to
biodiversity resources.
B. IntellectualProperty: InternationalPatentLaw

Intellectual property can be loosely divided into five types:
patents, trademarks, copyrights, breeder rights, and trade
secrets. Some authors place much faith in the proposition that
stronger and more pervasive protections of intellectual property
22
However,
rights will lead to improved environmental protection.
23
biotechnology
others note that, in the international context,
firms do not want to share profits with developing countries and
use intellectual property rights to protect their large profits from
of developing countries to claim a portion of the
the efforts
24
benefits.

The politicized debate obscured the fact that developing countries have
21.
a common heritage argument in their favor. The Law of the Sea Convention
negotiations involved disputes between the North and South over exploitation of
manganese nodules located on the sea floor. See United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 136, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted
in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (containing the first appearance of the common heritage
argument in international law). The South argued strongly that such nodules
should not be exploited by the North for the North's sole economic gain because
the manganese is the common heritage of mankind by virtue of its location on the
sea floor. Only the North possessed the technology necessary to access the
manganese. Even though developing countries were entitled to some benefit from
the nodules, they could not realize the benefit because often they lacked the
necessary technology. Developing countries sought to ensure that the manganese
was conserved and that its ultimate benefits were shared. Today, the North
possesses the technology to exploit genetic resources. Although tremendous
genetic resources are located within developing countries' territory, developing
countries cannot access those riches because they lack the requisite
technological capacity. If they could access their own biodiversity resources,
developing countries would be able to earn the necessary funds to improve their
economies and preserve their environment. Such preservation is to the benefit of
all nations. Therefore, developing countries can again argue that the common
heritage doctrine requires restrictions on the North's access to a resource that
can confer benefits on humankind as a whole.
Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve
See
22.
Environmental Protection, 4 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 193, 194 (1991) (claiming that
"increased reliance on intellectual property by environmental policy makers,
regulators, and managers will improve environmental protection while stimulating
beneficial economic and technical progress").
Biotechnology deals with "production of useful products by living
23.
micro-organisms and cell cultures." PHILIP W. GRUBB, PATENTS IN CHEMISTRY AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY 150 (1986).
See Gormley, supra note 13, at 156 (arguing that the benefits of
24.
intellectual property rights schemes are overstated). Moreover, Gormley argues
that, for developing countries, an intellectual property rights system is often very
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Patent law is the mechanism that presently attracts the most
attention from benefit-sharing advocates. The Uruguay Round of
GATI2 5 is the most recent effort to formalize an international
intellectual property law system capable of addressing biodiversity
Developing
prospecting.
The subject is highly controversial.
rights
over
intellectual
property
assert
that
countries
biotechnology are a major obstacle to benefit-sharing and
conservation.2f6
Developed countries disagree; they assert that
intellectual property rights protect fair rewards for innovation and
increase the technological benefits of biodiversity by enhancing
27
the commercial value of the genetic resources.
The Uruguay Round of GATT lavished attention on the
subject of Trade Related Intellectual Property and GATT's effort to
require the creation of plant intellectual property rights in all
member states. This effort created significant controversy among
representatives
of
developing
countries,
nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and environmental groups concerned with
plant conservation.2 8
The Uruguay Round's focus on

biotechnology may potentially increase large corporations' access
to third world resources. 29 GATT's effort to limit a nation's right
to 6xport its resources is of greatest benefit to multinational
corporations that seek to ensure that world resources will remain
cheap and readily accessible. 3 0
Many developing countries are not parties to GATT and are
therefore closed out of the GATT process.
Those developing
countries that are parties to GATT, however, generally oppose the
GATT intellectual property approach to biotechnology. This longstanding disagreement within GATT over intellectual property
issues is so severe that it is now contributing to diminished

damaging and costly because it provides.disparate protection to the inventions of
the North, while underprotecting the inventions of the South. Gormley argues
that the South can derive tangible benefits from the absence of intellectual
property laws, specifically the absence of patent laws. Id.
25.
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1. For a discussion of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAT) as it relates to biodiversity issues, see
Uruguay Round of GATT Provides New Forum for Debating Germplasm Ownership
Issues, 6 DIVERSTY 39 (1990).
26.
Downes, supranote 18, at 7.
27.
Id.
28.
Nel D. Hamilton, Who Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms for
Ownership of PlantGenetic Resources, 28 TULSA L.J. 587, 590 (1993).
29.
Michelle Syverson, Afterword, GATT,the Environment, and the Third
World, 23 ENVTL. L. 715, 716 (1992).
30.
Id. at 717.
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confidence in the GATT multilateral free trade process as a
31
whole.
Patent law is a product of the legal systems of the North. As
the system is currently structured, patent law does not allow a
naturally occurring substance to be patented; this is the "product
of nature exception."3 2 However, where a substance, "previously
unknown in its purified and isolated form," is refined so that the
product can be distinguished in kind, and where it also
demonstrates "unexpected properties," the refined substance is
patentable.3 3 The resulting United States patent endures for
twenty years from date of filing,34 although that period may be
extended for pharmaceuticals, which often experience delays in
the lengthy United States Food and Drug Administration approval

process. 3 5 This is the avenue used by the preponderance of
pharmaceutical corporations when creating and patenting a drug
derived from natural products.
A popular critique of the patent system is that it is highly
inequitable to give patent protection only to the companies that
isolate and then purify or synthesize an existing natural
compound.3 6 Although it is argued by some that patent law's
present refusal to protect compounds already existing in nature is
one of the system's critical drawbacks,3 7 this argument misses
the point. The issue is not whether to lower the threshold for
patentability to include products of nature, but whether there is a
38
need to reconceptualize the entire idea of "inventiveness."

Kirsten Peterson, Recent Development, Recent Intellectual Trends in
31.
Developing Countries, 33 HARV. INmLL.J. 277, 277-78 (1992).
See Gollin, supranote 22, at 198 (providing an overview of the present
32.
United States patent law system). The term "product of nature" is a term of art in
United States patent law and should not be confused with "natural products,"
which are the materials from which pharmaceuticals are created.
33.
Kadidal, supranote 16, at 238.
34.
Uruguay Round Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 154, among others, and changing the term of patent
to 20 years from date of filing. The previous term had been 17 years from date of
grant). This applies to all utility and plant patents filed on or after June 8, 1995.
Id.
35.
Gollin, supra note 22, at 210 n.92.
36.
See Lester I. Yano, Note, Protectionof the Ethnobiological Knowledge of
Indigenous Peoples, 41 UCLA L. REV. 443, 458 (1993) (discussing intellectual
property rights from the perspective of justice to indigenous peoples who preserve

etbnobotanical knowledge).
Kadidal, supranote 16, at 225.
37.
38.
Edgar J. Asebey, Andes Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: A New Model for
Biodiversity Prospecting 16 (Apr. 12, 1994) (unpublished paper, on file with the
author) (discussing the concepts of patents, inventorship, and the indigenous
paradigm
in
biodiversity
prospecting)
knowledge
chain-of-inventorship
See also Edgar J. Asebey, Indigenous
[hereinafter Asebey, New Model].
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There is very significant disagreement between the North and
South over biotechnology patents,3 9 and intellectual property in
developing countries is certainly a major source of contention
between North and South. 4°
International approaches to
biotechnology regulation, including patent and other laws, diverge
widely and any international harmonization will be difficult. 4 1 In
fact, "increased use is being made of patents ... to maintain a
dominant role in the production and marketing of research
42
results."
Although some authors argue that developing countries will
benefit from any strengthening of the international patent law
system, 43 other scholars of the system conclude that it is
economically unsound for developing countries to have a patent
44
system if a large majority of patents are granted to foreigners.
Support for developing country participation in the international
patent law regime hinges upon three assumptions. First, society
needs more inventions than would be made if society lacked
patent incentives. Second, the best incentive for creation of new
inventions is the exclusivity provided by the patent system.
Third, the granting of patents on inventions does actually lead to
45
economic development.
These three assumptions, however, are unwarranted. 4 6 In
fact, the international patent law system is often deceptively
harmful to developing countries, causing them to exchange real
rights for rights that are mostly theoretical. 4 7 Thus, it appears
that the international intellectual property system advances
developing countries' interests only after developing countries

Knowledge and Intellectual Property: Towards Equitable Compensation (Apr. 12,
1994) (unpublished paper, on file with the author) (discussing the patent system,
indigenous knowledge, and compensation mechanisms).
39.
See Gollin, supra note 22, at 215 (arguing that developing countries'

weak protection of intellectual property rights cause less technology transfer from
North to South). But see A. Samuel Oddi, The InternationalPatent System and
Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831 (arguing that
developing countries stand to gain little from stronger internal intellectual
property protections).

40.
Peterson, supranote 31, at 277.
41.
Gollin, supra note 22, at 217.
42.
U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNAIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND THE TRANSFER OF NEW AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES TO
DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES at 64, U.N. Doc. CS/CTC/98, U.N. Sales No. E.90.11,A.20

(1990).
43.
See, e.g., Kadidal, supra note 16; Downes, supra note 18; Gollin,
supranote 22.
44.
Oddi, supranote 39, at 832.

45.
46.
47.

Id. at 837, 843.
See id. (meticulously disproving each of those assumptions).
Id. at 856.
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acquire access to advanced technology, almost treating the
acquisition of such technology as a pre-requisite for development
of a patentable product.
The challenge is to accommodate the interests of both the
North and South within the broader context of a political and
economic debate of global proportions. If the answer to the
biodiversity question lies in intellectual property, the answer will
be long in coming. Because the needs of developing countries and
concerns regarding "biopiracy" are pressing, 48 the search for
solutions outside patent law continues.
C. InternationalFramework: The Biodiversity Convention
In June of 1993, the United States signed the U.N.
Convention on Biological Diversity. The previous summer, at the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED)4 9 in Rio de Janeiro, the United States was the only

country that refused to sign the Convention.50 Under the Bush
Administration, the United States objected to certain economic
and intellectual property provisions of the Convention. 5 ' It also
opposed the requirement of compensation for the use of biological
resources and transfer of biotechnology.5 2
Because the
Biodiversity Convention is not a self-executing treaty, the
Convention does not acquire the force of law in the United States
until the Senate ratifies it.
If the Senate does ratify the
Convention, the United States will participate in a global effort to
protect biodiversity and will gain the opportunity to influence
international policy on the subject. The potential consequences of
not ratifying the Convention, discussed infra, are substantial.

48.
Frances Williams, Bio-piracy Costs Third World $5.4bn a Year, FIN.
TIMES (London), Oct. 28, 1994, World Trade News, at 7. The term "biopiracy"
refers to the North's use of genetic biodiversity resources without appropriate

compensation.
49.
Also known as the Earth Summit. At UNCED, the Convention was
signed by 150 of the member states present. Walter V. Reid et al., A New Lease
on Life, in BIODIVERSrIY PROSPEcnNG: USING GENEIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 1, 24 (Walter V. Reid et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter BIODIVERSrYf
PROSPECTING].
50.
U.S. Objections to Biodiversity Treaty Based on Misreading of the Tex4
Study Says, 15 Int'l Envt. Rep. (BNA) 704 (Nov. 4, 1992).
51.
Biotechnology: Industry Trade Groups Laud PresidentBush for Decision
Not to Sign Biodiversity Treaty, 16 Chemical Reg. Rep. (BNA) 571 (June 12, 1992).
52.
Eugene Robinson & Michael Weisskopf, 'No' Leaves U.S. Isolated at

Summit, WASH. POST, June 6, 1992, at Al.
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1. Key Provisions
The objectives of the Convention are summarized in its first
article. 53 Technology transfer, conservation, sustainable use, and
the equitable sharing of benefits are the explicit objectives of the
Convention and are essential components of any bioprospecting
effort.
Article 8, In-situ Conservation, addresses
the

responsibilities that companies with access to the genetic
resources of the South owe to the indigenous peoples within
4
Southern countries.5
Article 16 is the main technology transfer reference in the
Convention and, along with Article 19, was the basis of the United
States initial objection to signing the Convention. Article 16
establishes a quid pro quo by linking the exchange of access to
genetic resources with the transfer of technology to the developing
world.5 5 Thus, the Convention creates a two way exchange. The

53. The objectives of this Convention, to be pursued in accordance with
its relevant provisions, are the conservation of biological diversity, the
sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of
the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by
appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of
relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources
and to technologies, and by appropriate funding.
Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.
54. Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate:
6) Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain
knowledge, innovations, and practices of indigenous and local
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their wider
application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such
knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing
of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations
and practices.

Id. art. 8.
55. (1) Each Contracting Party, recognizing that technology includes
biotechnology, and that both access to and transfer of technology among
Contracting Parties are essential elements for the attainment of the
objectives of this Convention, undertakes subject to the provision of this
Article to provide and/or facilitate access for and transfer to other
Contracting Parties of technologies that are relevant to the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity or make use of genetic
resources and do not cause significant damage to the environment ....
(3)
Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy

measures, as appropriate, with the aim that Contracting Parties, in
particular those that are developing countries, which provide genetic
resources are provided access to and transfer of technology which makes
use of those resources, on mutually agreed terms, including technology
protected by patents and other intellectual property rights, where
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South gives access to genetic resources and the North provides
compensation and technology transfer. Each is conditioned upon
the other.
In the Convention, access to genetic resources is closely
linked to equitable benefit-sharing. This arrangement permits
developing countries to receive some benefits from the
commercialization of their biological resources.
Article 15
reinforces developing countries' sovereign control over their
56
resources and emphasizes the mutuality of access agreements.
Article 19 explicitly states the developing world's expectation that,
in exchange for access to its biodiversity, it will receive a fair and
equitable portion of the benefits that the North derives from the
57
use of the South's genetic resources.
In summary, Articles 15 and 19 clearly announce that the
developing world's biodiversity can no longer be used for free.

Articles

15,

16,

17,

and

19 establish

the North-South

exchange-access to the South's genetic resources will continue
as long as relevant technologies and benefits are equitably shared

necessary, through the provisions of Article 20 and 21 and in accordance
with international law and consistent with paragraphs 4 and 5 below.
Id. art. 16.
56. (1) Recognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural
resources, the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests
with the national governments and is subject to national legislation ....

(4) Access, where granted, shall be on mutually agreed terms and subject
to the provisions of this Article ....

(7) Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or
appropriate policy measures, as appropriate, and in accordance with
Article 16 and 19 and, where necessary, through the financial
mechanisms established by Article 20 and 21 with the aim of sharing in a
fair and equitable way the results of research and development and the
benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic
resources with the Contracting Party providing such resources. Such
sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms.
Id. art. 15.
57. (2) Each Contracting Party shall take all practicable measures to
promote and advance priority access on a fair and equitable basis by
Contracting Parties, especially developing countries, to the results and
benefits arising from biotechnologies based upon genetic resources
provided by those Contracting Parties. Such access shall be on mutually
agreed terms.
Id. art 19.
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with the South. The challenge for all organizations involved in
biodiversity prospecting initiatives with other countries' natural
resources is to meet these new minimum requirements.
2. Inherent Conflicts
Numerous commentators
note that the Biodiversity
Convention suffers "from basic conceptual and drafting
deficiencies,"5 8 "memorializ[ing] rather than resolv[ing]" the
deadlocks of the Convention's negotiation, 5 9 with an end result
that has been deemed "impressively opaque."60 Nonetheless, the
Biodiversity Convention is a breakthrough.
It is a visible
admission by the international community that historically the
North has exploited the South's resources without providing
adequate compensation, usually with the source country's
consent.
The Convention is a crucial step in halting such
uncompensated exploitation. 6 1 Additionally, the Convention can
be regarded as a quid pro quo arrangement, under which the
North exchanges technological and financial support to developing
countries for access to biological resources. 6 2
Although
international conventions were promulgated to deal with various
aspects of species conservation in the period between the
Stockholm Declaration and the signing of the Biodiversity
Convention, each of those conventions was "fundamentally flawed
63
in one respect or another."
In its present form, the Convention contains serious defects,
which could prevent it from adequately protecting biodiversity. In
part, these defects are a natural result of the Convention's form
itself. Conventions typically contain a statement of broad goals
and procedures, but contain few, if any, substantive
requirements.6 4
Because international agreements require
consensus among many nations, they "tend to reflect the lowest

58.
Melinda Chandler, The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of
Interest to the InternationalLawyer, 4 COLO. J. INT' ENVrL. L. & POLY 141, 174
(1993).
59.
Downes, supra note 18, at 9.
60.
The Earth Conference: Biodivisive, ECONOMIST (United States), June 13,
1992, at 93, 94.
61.
Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, art. 3 (concerning a country's
sovereign right over its biodiversity); id. art. 15(1) (concerning a country's
authority to determine access to its genetic resources).
62.
Id. arts. 15, 16, 17, 19.
63.
See Coughlin, supra note 15, at 340.
64.
See generally Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the InternationalLaw
of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT'LL. 420 (1991).
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common denominator" rather than the majority standard. 65 Each
party must implement its own legislation in order to effectuate the
goals of the Convention. These legislative initatives will eventually
determine the strength or weakness of the Convention.
The Convention requires that countries gathering genetic
resources must do so on "mutually agreed terms" by obtaining
"prior informed consent."66 At first glance, this provision appears
to further developing countries' interests. The mutually agreed
terms requirement, however, is inconsistent throughout the text
67
and is subject to wide interpretation.

The Convention also requires buyers and source countries to
arrange "fair sharing" of the benefits they derive from the genetic
resources. 68 This provision appears to ensure compensation for
developing countries, but provides no guidance on the criteria for
fairness and does not address the issue of disparate bargaining
power. The combined effect of Articles 15 and 19, however, is to
vest in developing countries the right to exclude nationals of
foreign territories from access to biological organisms in their
69
territory.
Because the Biodiversity Convention never uses the phrase
"common heritage of mankind" to describe biodiversity resources,
the Convention appears to reject the argument, which initially
70
formed the basis of exploitation efforts of developed nations.
The Convention, however, does not choose to treat genetic
resources as a form of property like all other natural resources,
which are subject to tangible property rights.7 ' Although the
North's common heritage argument arguably failed in the
Convention, the North was able to prevent developing countries
from asserting full sovereign control over their resources. 72
However, local legislation within developing countries enables the
South to retain a great degree of control over genetic resources.
When the United States initially refused to sign the
Biodiversity Convention, it did so in part because of pressure
from the United States pharmaceutical and biotechnology

65.

Peter

H.

Sand,

International Cooperation:

Experience, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMEN.
LEADERSHIP 236, 240 (Jessica T. Mathews ed., 1991).

66.
67.

The

Environmental

THE CHALLENGE Op SHARED

Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, arts. 15(4), 15(5).
See, e.g., Chandler, Supra note 58, at 164.

68.
Biodiversity Convention, supranote 1, art. 15(7).
69.
Coughlin, supranote 15, at 363.
70.
Kadidal, supra note 16, at 231.
71.
See generally id. (arguing that intellectual property rights in genetic
resources should be created).
72.
Downes, supranote 18, at 10.
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industries.7" Representatives of these industries claimed that the
terms of Article 1674 would lead to compulsory licensing of United
States biotechnology. 75 In fact, these clauses most likely will not
lead to compulsory licensing as initially claimed. After the proConvention Clinton Administration came into office, the same
groups that had opposed the Convention recommended its
signing, announcing that "on closer reading" they had determined
there was little danger of compulsory licensing. 7 6 The United
States, still concerned over compulsory licensing, is drafting an
Interpretive Statement to protect United States-based companies

against the possible development of compulsory licensing.
Ultimately, the United States
did sign the Convention, 7 7 but the
78
it.
ratify
to
yet
has
Senate
Failure to ratify the treaty and to support the Convention and
the international consensus it represents is already beginning to
have repercussions for United States business interests. For
example, when the United States initially refused to sign the
Biodiversity Convention in 1992, Venezuela stopped signing new
agreements for scientific collaboration with United States
companies that wished to study genetic resources. 79 In addition,
in the spring of 1995, India threatened to block United States
access to its medicinal plants and other biological materials from
the Third World unless the United States ratifies the Convention
before the end of the summer of 1995.80
Numerous other
countries are waiting in the wings, ready to follow India's lead.8 1

73.
Robinson & Weisskopf, supra note 52, at Al.
74.
Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, art. 16(4) ("Each contracting
party shall take... measures ... with the aim that the private sector facilitates
access to joint development and transfer of technology... for the benefit of both
governmental institutions and the private sector of developing countries.").
75.
Biodiversity Treaty Risks Interfering with Patent Protections, Official
Says, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1071, 1072 (June 17, 1992).
76.
U.S. Objections to Biodiversity Treaty Based on Misreading of the Text,
Study Says, supranote 50, at 705.
77.
U.S. Reverses Bush's Rejection of EnvironmentalPact, L.A. TIMES, June

5, 1993, at A20.
78.

Sanjoy Hazarika, India Presses United States to Pass Biotic Treaty, N.Y.

TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, § 1, at 13.
79.

U.S. Objections to Biodiversity Treaty Based on Misreading of the Text,

Study Says, supranote 50, at 705.
80.
Hazarika, supra note 78.
81. "The mega-biodiverse countries of Latin America, South, and Southeast Asia are waiting for India to take the lead ....
If we do not have
progress this summer then we will meet to map out a joint strategy on the

transfer of genetic material."
The Indian position . . . has support from major countries with diverse
biological resources like Brazil, Indonesia and Malaysia....
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Thus, even if the Convention is not yet customary international
law in a technical sense, it is clear that on a practical level the
Convention is quickly becoming the benchmark of international
behavior. It now appears developing countries will demand that
future biodiversity prospecting efforts be conducted in
compliance with the letter and spirit of the Biodiversity
Convention.

IV. U.S.-BASED

BIOPROSPECTING INITIATIVES

In 1985, it was estimated that the world market for both
prescription and over-the-counter drugs based on plants was
about $43 billion.8 2 As of 1993, twenty-one pharmaceutical,
biotechnology, and institutional organizations were actively
involved in biodiversity prospecting.8 3 This section analyzes the
four prominent biodiversity prospecting initiatives in light of the
legal, financial, and political frameworks in which they have
evolved.
A. Moving Away From Common Heritage:
the National CancerInstitute
The National Cancer Institute (NCI) first began to study
natural products as a potential source of anti-cancer agents in
1955, making it one of the oldest bioprospecting programs in
existence. At that time, most investigators subscribed to the
common heritage doctrine, which proposes that plant genetic
resources are the heritage of humankind and therefore should be
freely available to all. This permitted the NCI to freely collect
plants and other natural products from dozens of countries by
merely paying collectors for their services.
As source countries became more aware of the potential value
locked in their biodiversity, a movement emerged that rejected the
common heritage doctrine and replaced it with the doctrine of
sovereignty. This movement culminated in the 1992 Biodiversity
Convention. As noted above, the Convention announces the
sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, a clear
repudiation of the common heritage doctrine.
The NCI has been sensitive to the changing international
approaches to biodiversity access. While it began its acquisition

82.
83.

Reid et al., supra note 49, at 7-12.
Id. at 8-13.
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program forty years ago, relying on the common heritage doctrine,
today the NCI is one of the leaders in implementing the mandates
of the Biodiversity Convention. This is especially notable since
the United States has not yet ratified the Convention. Currently,
no United States company or governmental body is legally
obligated to comply with the Convention and they can choose to
ignore any or all of its terms. Thus, while the NCI is an excellent
example of voluntary compliance with parts of the Convention,
there is little pressure or support for the NCI's full compliance.
1. History
In 1955, NCI established its Cancer Center Chemotherapy
National Service Center (CCNSC).8 4 The mission of the CCNSC
was to obtain and screen materials in the United States for
chemotheraputic activity and to develop active agents showing
promise for treating cancer. A large number of active agents were
isolated and characterized through this program. By 1980, the
NCI screened over 180,000 microbial extracts, leading to the
discovery of such clinically useful agents as doxorubicin,
mitomycin C, bleomycin, and mithramycin.8 5
During the same period, a collaborative drug discovery
program between the NCI and the United States Department of

Agriculture resulted in the collection and screening of over 35,000
plant samples, mainly from temperate regions of the world. The
collection led to over 114,000 extracts, yielding numerous
clinically active agents including, taxol from Taxus brevifolia,
semisynthetic derivatives of camptothecin from Camptotheca
acuminata, and
homoharringtonine
from
Cephalotaxus
harringtonia. The program also led to the following commercially
available plant-derived anti-cancer agents:
vinblastine and
vincristine (the Vinca alkaloids from the rosy periwinkle,
Catharanthys roseus),
and
etoposide
and
teniposide
(semisynthetic derivatives of epipodophyllotoxin, which is an
epimer of podophyllotoxin from Podophyllum peltatum and P.
emodi).86
In the mid-1970s, the NCI began screening marine organisms
as potential sources of antitumor agents. By 1981, the NCI

84.
Gordon M. Cragg et al., Drug Discovery and Development at the U.S.
National Cancer Institute: International Collaboration in the Search for New
Drugs from Natural Sources 1-2 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, available from
the Natural Products Branch, National Cancer Institute, Frederick Cancer
Research & Development Center, Building 1052, Room 109, P.O. Box B,
Frederick, MD, 21702-1201).
85.
Id. at2.
86.
Id.
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screened over 16,000 extracts derived from 561 species. The
screening led to two marine-derived agents, didemnin B and
bryostatin 1, which are advancing to clinical trials.8 7 In the early
1980s, the NCI Natural Products Program was discontinued
because it was concluded that only a few novel (and therefore
patentable) active leads were being isolated from natural sources.
The major objection to the program was that it had yielded few
agents effective against the resistant solid tumor disease types. It
is now widely recognized, however, that this apparent failure was
caused by the limitations of the in vivo primary mouse leukemia
screen that was being used, rather than by a deficiency in the

natural substances being tested.88
Beginning in 1985, the NCI adopted a new in vivo screening
strategy involving the use of sixty solid tumor cell lines.
Concurrently, a new natural products acquisition, extraction, and
isolation project was implemented. In 1987, the program was
extended to screen for agents for the treatment of AIDS. Today,
the mechanism for acquisition of natural products no longer
involves the United States Department of Agriculture. Instead,
the NCI awards collection contracts. Multi-year contracts were
awarded in 1986 to the Missouri Botanical Garden (MBG), the
New York Botanical Garden (NYBG), and the University of Illinois
at Chicago (UIC).8 9 Under the terms of the contract, the MBG
collects natural products throughout Africa and Madagascar, the
NYBG collects natural products in over ten South American
countries, and the UIC collects in at least twenty Southeast Asian
countries. 90 Additionally, marine organisms have been collected
Philippines,
from Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the
91
Thailand, and Antarctica through other contractors.
2. Letter of Collection
The NCI's Letter of Collection (LOC)92 is the legal instrument
the NCI uses to gain access to other countries' genetic resources.
Over the past four years, the LOC has evolved to include many of

87.
88.

Id.
Id.

89.
The UIC program is assisted by the Arnold Arboretum at Harvard
University and by the Bishop Museum in Honolulu.
90.
Asebey, New Model, supranote 38, at 4.

91.

Id.

92.
Letter of Collection:
Agreement Between Source Country and
Developmental Therapeutics Program, Division of Cancer Treatment, National
Cancer Institute (formerly known as the Letter of Intent (LOI)) (Apr. 21, 1995)

[hereinafter LOC] (on file with the author).
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the terms used in the Biodiversity Convention, attracting the
attention of several organizations interested in developing
adequate legal mechanisms for access to the South's biodiversity.
This is commendable because, as noted above, the United States
Senate still has not ratified the Biodiversity Convention, and
accordingly, the NCI has no mandate to fully comply with the
terms of the Convention.
The LOC has two major components. One component is the
role of the Developmental Therapeutics Program (DTP), the
Division of Cancer Treatment (DCT), and the NCI in the
collaboration (Role of NCI); 9 3 the other is the role of the source
country government or source country organization(s) in the
collaboration (Role of the SCG).9 4 The latter announces that
"permission of the traditional healer or community will be sought
before publication of their [sic] information, and proper
acknowledgement will be made of their [sic] contribution."9 5 This
section is consistent with the clause of the Biodiversity
Convention stating that each contracting party shall "preserve
and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous
and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles." 96
Furthermore, Section Four of the Role of NCI states that the
NCI "agrees to invite a senior technician or scientist designated by
[the source country] to work in the laboratories of DTP/NCI ...
using technology which would be useful in furthering work under
this agreement." 97 This is consistent with Article 12 of the
Convention, which calls for the establishment of scientific and
educational programs that can lead to the sustainable use of
biodiversity. 9 8
As discussed previously, Article 16 of the Convention sets the
guidelines governing access to and transfer of technology from the
North and South. The LOC's Section Five of the Role of NCI states
the NCI's commitment to technology transfer: "The DTP/NCI will
make a sincere effort to transfer any knowledge, expertise, and
technology developed during such collaboration in the discovery
and development process to [the source country]." 99

Section One of the Role of NCI announces that the NCI will
provide the results from its bioassays to the country of origin of
the biological material being tested. This conforms to the
Convention's requirement in Article 17 (1) and (2) regarding the

93.
94.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 4.

95.

Id. at 4.

96.
97.

Biodiversity Convention, supranote 1, art. 8(j).
LOC, supranote 92, at 2.

98.
99.

Biodiversity Convention, supranote 1, art. 12.
LOC, supranote 92, at 2.
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exchange of information.
Section Five of the Role of NCI
announces that, where a promising agent from a plant collection
in a source country is isolated, "further development of the agent
will be undertaken by DTP/NCI in collaboration with [the source
country] .....
100 This provision conforms with the Biodiversity
Convention's Article 18 (1) and (2), the "Technical and Scientific
Cooperation Guidelines."
Finally, Section Eight of the Role of NCI provides that, if a
promising agent is isolated from a plant collected in a source
country and it is eventually licensed to a pharmaceutical
company, the NCI "will require the successful licensee to negotiate
and enter into agreement(s) with the Source Country Government
agency(ies) or Source Country Organization(s) as
appropriate." 10 1 To some extent, this LOC section is consistent
with Article 19 (2) of the Biodiversity Convention, which calls for
equitable treatment of the benefits arising from biotechnologies
based upon genetic resources provided by source countries. 102
Through the use of the LOC, as it is currently written, the
NCI clearly has moved away from the common heritage doctrine.
But without ratification of the Convention by the United States,
there is no mandate to completely adhere to the Convention. This
is problematic because there are several important areas of the
Convention that are not fully satisfied by the LOC.
Perhaps the most important of these areas is the sharing, on
an equitable basis, of the benefits resulting from discoveries
derived from genetic resources. While Section Eight of the Role of

NCI indicates that the NCI will require any pharmaceutical
company licensing technology to negotiate and come to an
agreement with the source country,' 0 3 it does not provide any
guarantees that this agreement will be equitable.
The NCI's
ability to offer compensation to source countries is limited
because the NCI is a branch of the Department of Health and
Human Services, a United States government agency. Therefore,
the NCI must conform to federal regulations regarding the
licensing of federally-funded technology. The net effect is that
the NCI cannot enter into deals with source countries for the
sharing of future royalties. The source country must wait until a
pharmaceutical company licenses an NCI technology that is based
upon the source country's natural product.

100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, art. 19 (2).

103.

LOC, supra note 92, at 3.
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There is no reason to assume that a developing country's
government or institution will be able to bargain on equal footing
with the licensee, which most likely is a multinational
pharmaceutical company. Furthermore, the customary secrecy
surrounding actual royalty rates paid to source countries
increases the possibility of an inequitable agreement. Both of
these problems are present in the other initiatives discussed infra.
Finally, the licensee has little incentive to work out a supply
contract with the source country if the bioactive compound of
interest has already been synthesized in the laboratory. Thus,
taking the NCI out of the compensation negotiations does not
necessarily lead to the equitable distribution of benefits.
Treatment of indigenous knowledge is another area in which
the LOC falls short of the Convention. While the Convention calls
for the parties to preserve and maintain knowledge, innovation,
and practices of indigenous and local communities, it also
requires the equitable sharing of benefits arising from their
utilization.'1 4 While Section Two of the Role of SCG announces
that the NCI will ask permission of an indigenous healer before
publishing information obtained from her and will properly
acknowledge her when that information is published,1 0 5 there are
no provisions in the LOC to guarantee an equitable sharing of
financial benefits arising from that knowledge. Perhaps this
stems from the incorrect assumption that national governments
represent the interests of indigenous people. This is necessarily
not the case in the developing world where indigenous peoples'
interests are often at odds with those of their countries'
governments. Although the indigenous knowledge of medicinal
plants may rise to the level of an "intellectual contribution," (the
standard for inventorship in the United States), 0 6 the LOC
contains no provisions to ensure that these contributions are
properly compensated.
Despite these shortcomings, the NCI's LOC remains an influential legal instrument, which continues to move away from
the common heritage doctrine and closer to the objectives of the
Biodiversity Convention. Analysis of the NCI's LOC provides a
lucid comparison with the goals of the Biodiversity Convention.
Unlike the LOC, the contractual terms of other bioprospecting
initiatives have generally been kept secret. Therefore, a similarly
rigorous textual analysis of the following sections of this Article
cannot be undertaken.

104.
105.
106.

Biodiversity Convention, supranote I, art. 8
LOC, supranote 92, at 5.
Asebey, New Model, supra note 38, at 16.

U).

1995]

BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING

B. BilateralContracts: 1NBio-Merck Agreement
The INBio-Merck Agreement was created by Merck & Co., a
corporation based in New Jersey, and the National Biodiversity
Institute (INBio), a Costa-Rican nonprofit organization created by
decree of the Costa Rican government.0 7 When it was signed on
September 20, 1991, it was hailed as the wave of the future.1 0 8

The mere existence of a bilateral plant collection agreement is a
recent positive development.109
In the past, pharmaceutical
companies have either collected samples themselves or through a
private collector.
In both cases, pharmaceutical companies
traditionally did not request permission for the right of access or
provide remuneration for the ,use and commercialization of such
resources. 110
The terms of the Merck agreement, like those of other
bilateral agreements, are largely confidential and therefore
difficult to analyze. 1 1 ' It is known that Merck paid an initial $1
million prospecting fee, promised to transfer some technology,
train some scientists, and pay an unspecified royalty from future
112
profits if an INBio extract yields a commercially viable product.
In return, Merck received INBio's research services, genetic
material location services, genetic material screening services,

107. Although some authors identify INBio as a governmental entity, see
Coughlin, supra note 15, at 356 (saying that an agreement "was struck between
the United States pharmaceutical firm, Merck and the government of Costa Ricd'
[italics added]), it is not a governmental entity. See Cooperative Agreement
Between the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy, and Mines (Costa Rica) and
the Association, National Biological Diversity [Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad]
(INBio), May 11, 1992 (available from INBio, Apdo. 22-3100 Santo Domingo,
Heredia, Costa Rica [hereinafter MIRENEM-INBio Agreement] (creating INBio as a
nonprofit association).
108. "[I]t is the prototype of an international system for 'chemical
prospecting' in wild areas throughout the world, and returning to countries of
origin a share of any profits from... substances derived from natural resources."
Charles Petit, New Effort to Save Tropical Rain Forests: Pact on Natural "Chemical
Prospecting7S.F. CHRON., Sept. 21, 1991, at A15.
109.
Rubin & Fish, supranote 17, at 28.
110.
Id.
111.
Summary of Terms, CollaborationAgreement, IVBio-Merck & Co., Inc.
(press release by INBio detailing the contract's provisions) (available from INBio,
Apdo. 22-3100 Santo Domingo, Heredia, Costa Rica) [hereinafter INBio-Merck
Agreement].
112. This rate is believed to be 1-3%. INBio stated that "the royalty rate
falls into the range of royalty rates which is typical for agreements of this kind."
Summary of Terms, CollaborationAgreement INBio-Merck & Co., Inc., supra note
105. This range is known to be 1-5%. Sarah A. Laird, Contractsfor Biodiversity
Prospecting,in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECnNG, supranote 48, at 99, 111.
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and the exclusive right to patent an undisclosed number of
11 3
products developed under the agreement.
Arguably, the INBio-Merck agreement's greatest value to
developing countries is its tacit recognition that the North accepts
developing countries' claims to compensation and realizes that
compensation should be given for both the use of genetic material
as well as the search for such material. 1 14 The agreement,

however, raises significant concerns for developing countries.
One major concern is the amount of the royalty INBio will
receive for the sale of genetic resources. Because the terms of the
agreement were not publicized, it is unclear whether Costa Rica is
being fairly compensated. Unconfirmed reports place the royalty
to INBio from new Merck products at one to three percent. 1 15 The
typical royalty range for undeveloped drug products is one to five
percent, 1 6 and the one to three percent rate may be seen as
appropriate because the costs of collection and extraction (the
services INBio provides to Merck) are roughly equal to one to three
percent of the total drug discovery cost.
Some claim that, if Costa Rica is undercompensated by the
terms of the Merck agreement, it is Costa Rica's natural
resource-the
knowledge
of
the
structure
of
drug
compounds-that is being undervalued."1 7 Indeed, the agreement
does not value Costa Rica's plant and genetic resources per se,
but rather compensates Costa Rica for the investment INBio
makes into the processing of those resources. Theoretically, the
conservation goals of the Biodiversity Convention would be better
served if developing countries' property rights were broad enough
to extract full economic rents from those who benefit from its

113.
114.

INBio-Merck Agreement, supranote 111.
Hamilton, supra note 28, at 628.

115. PharmaceuticalCompanies Go 'Chemical Prospecting"for New Medicine,
PHARMACEUTICAL BUS. NEWS, Aug. 21, 1992, at *4 availablein Westlaw, PTS-NEWS
Database. Current industry practice suggests that 3% is the most accurate
figure. Feinsilver, supra note 2, at 29. Some reports place the royalty rate as
high as 51%-60%. See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 629 (citing Christopher
Joyner, Prospectorsfor Tropical Medicines, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 19, 1991, at 38).
However, the figure is unrealistic and probably results from confusion of the
terms in the INBio-Merck Agreement and the MIRENEM-INBio Agreement. Under
the terms of the latter, when INBio receives money from Merck at the undisclosed
compensation rate (roughly 1-3%), INBio must turn over at least 50% of those
funds and 10% of the INBio budget for certain research projects to the Costa Rica
National Parks Fund which MIRENEM administers.
See MIRENEM-INBio
Agreement, supranote 107, clauses 4 and 5. Thus, the 50-60% figure represents
INBio's obligations to MIRENEM, not Merck's obligations to INBio.
116. Laird, supra note 106, at 112.
117. Kadidal, supra note 16, at 234.
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genetic resources.1 1 8 Practically, however, this argument does
little to advance the interests of Costa Rica or other developing
countries.
The services that INBio provides to Merck are of limited
scientific scope. INBio contracted to supply Merck roughly 2000
natural products extracts for screening, yet Merck's annual
through-put' 1 9 is far greater.
Merck's screening equipment
120
requires at least 5,000 samples per week to operate efficiently,
and it is not uncommon for United States pharmaceutical
companies such as Merck to have a weekly through-put of 10,000
samples. 12 1 Thus, INBio supplies Merck with less than one week's
work over a period of two years. Even the value of the technology
transferred through the agreement is small. Merck agreed to
transfer the technology needed to produce the extracts destined
for its research and development laboratories in the United
States. The technology's market value of only $130,000 is limited
22
in light of Merck's total research and development budget.'1
The INBio-Merck contract's significance is also defined in
terms of the benefits to Costa Rica's natural resources. It is true
that ten percent of INBio's initial revenue and fifty percent of its
profits from any drug developed through Merck will be donated to
Costa Rica's National Park system.' 23
What receives little
attention, however, is that such donations are not the result of
Merck's or INBio's disinterested generosity. The ten percent and
fifty percent nations are required by the Costa Rican
governmental decree that created INBio in 1992.124 Moreover, the
fifty percent donation represents, only fifty percent of the one to
three percent of profits that Merck has agreed to repatriate to
INBio.

118. Id. See also Yano, supra note 36, at 467-68 (discussing rent
dissipation theory in the context of compensating ethnobotanical knowledge and
defining rent as the "difference between what society would pay for an innovation
and its actual cost of development") (quoting Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander,
PatentLaw andRent Dissipation,78 VA. L. REV. 305, 308 (1992)).
119. "Through-put" refers to the number of samples that a laboratory can
screen for bioactivity in any given period.
120. Feinsilver, supra note 2, at 29.
121. Chapela, supranote2, at 16.
122. Telephone Interview with Nicole Bruno, Public Affairs Department,
Merck & Co., quoting the 1994 Annual Report which puts Merck's annual

research and development expenses at $1,230,600,00 (Sept. 27, 1995).
123. Ana Sittenfeld & Renata Villers, Exploring and PreservingBiodiversity in
the Tropics: the Costa Rican Case, 4 CURR. OPINION IN BICYOECHNOLOGY 280, 283
(1993).
124.

INBio-Merck Agreement, supra note 111, cls. 4, 5.
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One author concisely highlights the inherent defect of the
Biodiversity Convention, the Merck agreement, and probably all
future substantive bilateral contracts: "[Tihe Merck-Costa Rica
deal
. provides for the transfer of some very valuable
technology without going beyond what the owner of that
technology, Merck, would tolerate."12 5 Here is the developing
countries' central challenge: It will never be in the interest of
multinational pharmaceutical corporations to transfer the
technology developing countries most want and need, because the
multinational corporations have tremendous incentive to protect
their market share.1 2 6 Certainly, INBio's provision of one week's
worth of samples is unlikely to persuade Merck to transfer the
technology or know-how Costa Rica would need to become an

independent pharmaceutical producer and viable competitor.
The agreement's main value for both INBio and Merck 12is7
probably public relations rather than actual genetic discovery.
Aside from any drug development through the INBio agreement,
the extensive, free, and favorable publicity given to Merck has
already caused Merck to recoup its investment in the
agreement.128 In fact, Merck renewed its contract with INBio
despite the lack of any significant scientific leads during the first
contract. Such continued good public relations must certainly be
welcome in light of the pharmaceutical company bashing that
accompanied recent debates over United States health care
reform. 129 Indeed, the publicity surrounding the INBio-Merck
agreement was called "the best public relations investment of the
130
[pharmaceutical] industry in recent times."
Within Costa Rica, INBio's success is measured not by
"products" in the traditional sense, but in terms of the massive

125. Coughlin, supranote 15, at 359.
126. The Biodiversity Convention fails to address or resolve this potent
disincentive. One author's comment on a domestic United States law could just
as easily have been made about the Biodiversity Convention: "This law wishfully
presumes capital 'A' Altruism among these.., actors not because it will happen
but because it is a necessary assumption to make the law work." William H.
Rodgers Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Panda's Thumbs,
Statutory Sleepers, andEffective Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25, 74 (1993).
127. Secrecy surrounding the terms of the agreement probably furthers the
goal of good publicity for Merck. Secrecy focuses attention on what is known,
that INBio will donate 50% of its royalties to Costa Rica's National Parks, rather
than on what is not known, that INBio's royalty rate is probably only 3% at most.
128. Karen A. Goldman, Note, Compensationfor Use of BiologicalResources

Under the Convention on Biological Diversity: Compatibility of Conservation
Measures and Competitiveness of the Biotechnology Industry, 25 LAW & POLY INr'L

BUS. 695, 720 n. 148 (1994).
129.

Feinsilver, supranote 2, at 45-46.

130.

Chapela, supra note 2, at 11.
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international media profile it acquired. 1 3 1 The extreme novelty of
the agreement, which generated such media attention, may be
l3 2
responsible for the subsequent lack of similar agreements.
Given that bilateral contracts are now no longer a novel feature of
the international landscape, other source countries following in
the wake of the INBio-Merck agreement will not be able to
capitalize on the same level of media attention.
Finally, unlike other developing countries, Costa Rica is
optimally positioned to attract foreign interest in its biodiversity.
Costa Rica possesses a high level of scientific and business
management expertise, as well as a profound commitment to
environmental conservation.13 3 It is one of the richest biological
regions in the world, containing nearly four percent of all the
34
world's terrestrial species and at least half a million species.'
Costa Rica also has a particularly favorable socio-political climate,
having enjoyed democracy for over a century.
Today, the
country's indices of health, education, and literacy are
comparable to those of major industrial nations. 135 Moreover,
INBio's operations do not focus solely upon biodiversity
prospecting.
INBio has four distinct divisions:
biodiversity
inventory, biodiversity information management, biodiversity
information dissemination, and biodiversity prospecting.' 3 6 The
Merck contract relates solely to the latter division. Finally, the
protected areas from which INBio collects natural products for its
biodiversity prospecting operations are areas devoid of indigenous
people. By choosing to collect only in these areas, INBio has
avoided the contentious issues surrounding the use and adequate
compensation of indigenous knowledge. This choice makes the
INBio model even less applicable to countries with large
indigenous populations.
In summary, the INBio-Merck agreement is not a viable
model for most developing countries to use in their attempts to
derive significant income from biodiversity prospecting.
For
INBio, biodiversity prospecting has meant locating, identifying,
extracting, and selling natural products. While this is a laborious
task, it is still roughly equal to only one to three percent of the
value-adding necessary to get a natural products-based

131. Id. at9.
132. Id.
133. Feinsilver, supra note 2, at 30-32, 46 (listing the qualities that
enhance INBio's bargaining position vis d vis other potential source countries and

institutions).
134.
135.
136

Sittenfeld & Villers, supranote 122, at 281.
Id
INBio-Merck Agreement, supra note 111.
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pharmaceutical to market. If developing nations seek to promote
conservation and sustainable economic development through
responsible biodiversity use, they will have to provide more than
3% of the value-adding to their biodiversity products.
C. MultilateralContracts: ICBGs
The International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups (ICBGs)
are five consortia composed of United States academics,
pharmaceutical companies, and various developing world
counterparts. The groups are funded by the National Institutes of
Health, the National Science Foundation, and the Agency for
International Development.
Each ICBG receives between
$400,000 and $475,000 annually for a period of five years
beginning in 1994.137 The stated purpose of the ICBGs is that
each group "will collaborate on projects which address
biodiversity conservation and the promotion of sustained
economic activity through drug discovery from natural
138
products."
The typical ICBG project involves
a
multinational
pharmaceutical corporation, a nongovernmental organization, a
United States university, and a source country collaborating
institute.
Collections and extractions, as well as some
preliminary screening in some cases, are performed in the source
country. The majority, if not all, of the screenings are performed
in the United States in the laboratories of the pharmaceutical

corporation. 139
At a 1994 conference on biodiversity, biotechnology, and
sustainable development held in Costa Rica, 140
Dr. Ignacio
Chapela, who referred to the ICBGs as a "visionary
conception," 14 1 raised several troubling questions about the
program. First, several of the ICBGs greatly limit the potential
use of their industrial partners' capacity when they choose to
collect plants using ethnobotanical leads. While it is estimated

137. Francesca T. Griffo, Chemical Prospecting: An Overview of the
InternationalCooperative Biodiversity Groups Program, in EMERGING CONNECrIONS:
BIODIVERSIIY, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN HEALTH AND
AGRICULTURE (Julie Feinsilver ed., forthcoming 1995).
138. Chapela, supra note 2, at 15-16 (quoting press release from the U.S.
Agency for International Development, U.S. National Institutes of Health, and U.S.
National Science Foundation (Dec. 7, 1993)).
139.
Asebey, New Model, supranote 38, at 3-16.

140.

Pan American

Cooperation

in

Health Organization-Inter American

Agriculture

(PAHO-IICA

Symposium

on

Institute for
Biodiversity,

Biotechnology, and Sustainable Development, in San Jose, Costa Rica (Apr. 1214, 1994).

141.

Chapela, supra note 2, at 16
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that about 20,000 medicinal plants in the world have been
multinational
the
ethnobotany,142
through
identified
pharmaceutical corporations involved in the ICBGs have high
through-put screening programs that can test up to 10,000
samples per week. 14 3 Chapela believes this discrepancy exists
because the priorities of the academic partners in the groups take
precedence over those of the industrial partners. 144
Second, it is notable that Bristol-Myers-Squibb is the
industrial partner in three of the five ICBGs. It is also notable
that companies with long traditions in natural products drug
discovery are missing from the ICBGs. Chapela reported that this

may be attributable to a less than rigorous selection criteria for

industrial partners.' 45 Third, because the ICBGs focus upon
academic research, the ICBGs generally do not require all
partners to commit to conservation of local biodiversity and
equitable distribution of profits from drug discovery. Chapela
noted that, during the first public announcement of the ICBGs,
the pharmaceutical partners were absent.146
While all of Dr. Chapela's observations are valuable, the third
is the most significant. All of the agreements between the
pharmaceutical companies and the source country collaborators
As in the
contain undisclosed royalty payment agreements.
INBio-Merck agreement, the royalty rates are considered
confidential business information. This makes monitoring of the
fairness of these deals nearly impossible. As long as there is no
disclosure, there will be little accountability and plenty of
deniability.
Because of the nondisclosure of royalty rates, it remains an
open question whether the proper arrangements are in place to
ensure the equitable sharing of benefits with the source country.
1994, the Rural Advancement Foundation
In November
International (RAFI) published the royalty terms contained in one
of the ICBG contracts. 14 7 The terms published were the royalty
payment agreement negotiated by the Monsanto Corporation and
Washington University for the ICBG project that will study
According to the agreement, the
Peruvian medicinal plants.
royalty payments would be "based on a sliding scale, ranging from

142.

Id.

143.

Id.

144.

Id.

Id.
145.
Id.
146.
Bioprospecting/Biopiracy and Indigenous Peoples, RAFI COMMUNIQUE
147.
(Rural Advancement Found. Intl, Ontario, Can.) Nov. 1994, at 7.
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1% to 0.2% of [the] net sales of a licensed product." 14 8 Monsanto
would pay one percent only if (1) "the licensed product
incorporates a [p]lant [e]xtract, isolated or synthetic natural
product or analog or isomer thereof present in such fp]lant
[eixtract, and (2) [the product] is sold for the same use as the
historical use by the [i]ndigenous [p]eople [who use] the plant
from which the ... [e]xtract was obtained."14 9 "Up to one-half of
that [0.2%-1%] royalty payment must first be used to reimburse

individual ICBG member institutions for any reasonable direct
costs for research, development and invention management." I5s
Additionally, the RAFI report states that, under the terms of the
Monsanto-Washington University agreement, indigenous peoples
may not receive any royalties at all "in the event that the
biological activity of an active agent was in the public domain or
was known or otherwise available to [Monsanto]...." 1 5 1
If this agreement is representative of the types of deals the
pharmaceutical companies made with their source country
counterparts, the ICBGs have not gone very far in creating an
equitable sharing of benefits resulting from the use of the
developing world's biodiversity. On the other hand, because most
of the "value-adding" (i.e., screening, structural elucidation, and
clinical trials) is being performed and funded by the
pharmaceutical company, it may be quite equitable that they
receive ninety-nine percent of the potential royalties.
Thus appears the fundamental problem in all of the programs
this section has analyzed: ninety-nine percent of the valueadding in biodiversity prospecting projects is still being performed
outside the source country, primarily in the United States. Until
this arrangement changes, it will be difficult if not impossible to
justify more than one or two percent royalty rates for source
countries. Only when advanced screening technology, know-how,
and financial support for these activities are transferred to a
source country will it be possible to justify a greater royalty rate
for developing source countries.
D. PrivateSector Bioprospecting: Shaman Pharmaceuticals
In 1989, Shaman Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Shaman) was
founded with the goal of developing pharmaceuticals using

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting the License Option Agreement between G.D. Searle & Co.
and Washington University for Peruvian Plant Extract Collection).
151. Id. at 6 (quoting the License Option Agreement between G.D. Searle &
Co. and Washington University for Peruvian Plant Extract Collection).
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ethnobotanical knowledge. 1 5 2 Shaman screens plants known to
be used by native peoples in at least three geographically distinct
regions. 153 Its approach is based upon the premise that working
with traditional healers is a more .efficient method of identifying
15 4
useful drugs than the industry practice of random screenings.
Shaman's exclusive interest in ethnobotanical-based drug
discovery has garnered tremendous positive press attention.155
The company also has created a nonprofit organization, the
Healing Forest Conservancy, to channel future profits back into
source countries.1 5 6 However, until a Shaman product generates
profits for the company, the Healing Forest Conservancy is limited
in the benefits that it can return to the indigenous peoples of

source countries.15 7

Even without realizing profits, Shaman

claims to expend approximately twenty percent of its plant
prospecting budget to assist the native communities that share
15 8
their ethnobotanical information.

Lisa Conte, Shaman's president, formerly worked for a

venture capital firm and holds advanced degrees in both
physiology/pharmacology

and

15 9

business.

Shaman

has

undergone two rounds of venture capital-raising and sports an
Despite the daunting risks
impressive array of investors.160
inherent in the drug discovery business, its initial stock offerings
Although
were very successful and raised great hopes. 16 1
Shaman is currently funding clinical trials for two of its leads, Eli

152.
"Ethnobotany" is most simply defined as the study of how indigenous
people use plants. See CHRISTINE FRANQUEMONT ET AL., THE ETHNOBOTANY OF
CHINCHERO, AN ANDEAN COMMUNITY IN SOUTHERN PERU 1 (1990).
Gary Stix, Back to Roots: Drug Companies Foragefor New Treatments,
153.
Plant-DerivedPharmaceuticals,ScI. AM., Jan. 1993, at 142.
154. William K. Stevens, Scientists and Shamans Seek Cures in Plants,
MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 2, 1992, at 7C.
155.
See infra notes 156-61, 166, 169-70, 173, 176 a sample of the
intensive press coverage.
Cashing in on
156. Thomas A. Carr, Rain Forest Entrepreneurs:
Conservation,ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1993, at 12.
157.
Katy Moran, Director of Healing Forest Conservancy, Comments at the
Biodiversity and Human Health Seminar in Washington, D.C., Smithsonian
Seminar Series (Apr. 3-4, 1995).
158. Thomas M. Burton, Magic Bullets: Drug Company Looks to "Witch
Doctors"to ConjureProducts,WALL ST. J., July 7, 1994, at Al.
Pharmaceutical Companies Go "Chemical Prospecting" for New
159.
Medicines, supra note 115, at *3.
160.
Shaman's investors include Technology Funding, Salomon Brothers,
Odyssey Fund, Calvert Social Venture Partners, and Capital Health Venture
Partners. Id. at *4.
Anne Newman,
161.
Shaman's initial offering generated $3 million.
Shaman's IPO Success Sets Examplefor Biotech Firms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1993,
at B2.
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Lilly, Shaman's pharmaceutical-industry partner, chose not to
renew its research contract with Shaman when it expired in
October 1994.162
The very nature of venture capital financing is to create
tremendous pressure for short term profits to compensate the
venture capital investors for the unusually high degree of risk
they undertake. Because the degree of risk is so high, investors
typically expect a return of 1000% to 5000% on their initial
investment. 163 A broad rule of thumb is that venture capitalists

will not invest in a company unless they foresee the possibility of
receiving at least ten times the amount of their initial investment
within the first five years, and they seek even greater returns in
early stage companies that require five to seven years to
develop. 164
Moreover, because the risk to venture capital
investors is so great, they also expect the total sales of the
business to be very high. 165 Thus, the message to investors is
clear: "There's no sense taking a long shot unless it pays off big if
you win. Second, cut your losses; identify losers early, and if you
can't fix the problem.. . throw no good money after bad." 16 6 The
high stakes cut-and-run philosophy that underpins venture
capital enterprises is the reason the Lilly withdrawal was
interpreted by Wall Street as a vote of no-confidence in Shaman's
ethnobotanical approach,1 6 7 and caused a precipitous decline in
the value of Shaman's stock. 168
In the aftermath of its stock decline, Shaman acknowledged
that it was reassessing and reprioritizing its research
programs. 169 It also undertook significant internal restructuring

162.
Shaman's clinical trials are being conducted on Provir, an oral drug to
treat respiratory viral infections, and Virend, a topical anti-viral drug to treat
herpes. Conclusion of Antifungal Research Alliance, Eli Lilly and Co. and Shaman
Pharmaceuticals,BUSINESSWIRE, Oct. 12, 1994 available in Westlaw, Database IntNews.
163.

CHRISTINE AMMER & DEAN S. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BUS. & ECON., 406

(1984) (defining "risk capital" and "venture capital").
164.
Jane Koloski Morris, Venture Capital I
Industry Structure and
Investment Strategy in 2 CAPITAL RAISING & FIN. STRUCTURE 361 (Robert Lawrence
Kuhn ed. 1990).
165.
Frederick R. Adler, Venture Capital I: What Venture CapitalistsLook For
in 2 CAPITAL RAISING & FIN. STRUCTURE 378 (Robert Lawrence Kuhn ed. 1990).
Venture capitalists typically will not invest in a company unless it can be

expected to have sales of 50 million within five years and yield ten times, the
initial investment within seven years. Id.

166.

RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWARr C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORP. FIN. 341-

42 (4th ed. 1991).
167.
Shaman Says Lilly Ends Alliance; Stock Tumbles, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13,
1994, at B7.
168
Feinsilver, supranote 2, at 48.
169.
John Eckhouse, Eli Lilly Ends Investment in Shaman, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
13, 1994, at D1.
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and apparently changed its focus from one of ethnobotanical
collection to in vivo whole animal model testing. 170 Laying off
forty percent of its staff, Shaman drastically altered key areas of
its corporate structure, downsized its anti-infectives program,
eliminated anti-fungal screening efforts, and cut back on antiviral screening. 17 1 Although this restructuring may make the
company more sound, it also means that the Shaman model can
no longer act as a guide for countries of the South that seek to
use biodiversity prospecting as a way to assist their economic
development and preserve their environment.
The Shaman experience is significant because it represents
one corporation's attempt to use biodiversity prospecting to help
the inhabitants of Southern source countries. Shaman's failure
to meet expectations for its success is a powerful illustration of
the limitations of United States biotechnology fin-ms. Such firms
are generally small, heavily reliant on venture capital, and
characterized more by ideas and promises than by actual product
output. 172
Despite the Shaman founders' good intentions of
benefiting Southern source countries, the very nature of the
biotech industry requires that the overarching goal must always
be short-term profit.
Section Four of this Article traced the evolution of biodiversity
prospecting mechanisms and highlighted the challenges that
confront any effort to create a workable North-South biodiversity
prospecting arrangement. The National Cancer Institute, through
its Letters of Collection, led the charge away from the common
heritage doctrine approach and toward the objectives of the
Biodiversity Convention.
But without the United States
ratification of the Biodiversity Convention, it is difficult for the

170.
Feinsilver, supra note 2, at 41. The usual testing steps are: (1)
preliminary screening to determine general bioactivity; (2) advanced screening to
determine selective bioactivity; (3) fractionation and structural elucidation of the
bioactive molecule; (4) in vivo whole animal model testing; and (5) in vivo human
testing. When initial chemical screenings (Steps 1, 2, and 3) suggest that a given
substance will be effective in people, the substance is then tested on nonhuman
animals (Step 4). If the substance appears to be effective in these other animals
without being unduly harmful, the substance is then tested on humans (Step 5).

Shaman's new approach takes the in vivo animal testing step, which is usually
Step 4, and uses it as the preliminary screen (Steps 1 and 2). Shaman believes
this method will permit it to efficiently obtain information on both the substance's
bioactivity (usually found in the first two steps) and its oral bioavailability and
toxicity (usually determined in the in vivo animal testing stage). See Shaman
Inverts Its Drug Development Model, BIOCENTURY PART II BI (The Bernstein Report
on Bio Business) Nov. 14, 1994.
171.
Id.
172.
Chapela, supra note 2, at 13-14.
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NCI to go much farther in fulfilling all the objectives of the
Convention.
The ICBG Program is the first multi-party bioprospecting
initiative that attempts to incorporate all the major objectives of
the Biodiversity Convention. It opens the way to comprehensive
implementation of the Convention. The major deficiency of the
program appears to be its inability to arrange for equitable
benefit-sharing between its corporate participants in the North
and its source country participants in the South.
Still, it
represents a new standard of compliance to the Biodiversity
Convention.
The landmark INBio-Merck agreement established an
important precedent: Northern companies seeking access to the
South's genetic resources will need to pay for that access. The
agreement is an important step forward in compliance with the
objectives of the Biodiversity Convention. Unfortunately, the
INBio scenario is not readily reproducible in other parts of the
developing world, thus limiting its utility.
Post-Convention
bilateral contracts such as the INBio-Merck agreement may lack

substance. If they are substantive, multinational pharmaceutical
companies' overweening bargaining power may render each
individual source country unable to negotiate on an equal footing.
Such inequity causes the agreement to be disproportionately
beneficial to the pharmaceutical company and to undervalue the
developing country's biodiversity.
Venture-capital funded Shaman Pharmaceuticals showed the
private sector that there is money to be made in natural productsbased drug discovery. Shaman's effort focused interest not only
on natural products, but also upon indigenous peoples'
knowledge of the use of medicinal plants. With Shaman's recent
shift away from ethnobotanically-driven drug discovery, even the
best-intentioned biotechnology company is unlikely to repatriate a
substantial portion of its profits. The very nature of venturecapital financing subordinates corporate altruism to bottom-line
profits.
The common thread in all of the initiatives discussed above is
an unequal distribution of value-adding activities. Most of the
significant value-adding is performed in the United States. This
causes the majority of profits to be returned to the developed
country entity. The owners of the biotechnology that developing
countries need are the same corporate interests that profit from
the South's low level of technology. In summary, the biodiversity
initiatives implemented thus far are the product of the North's
institutions and, not surprisingly, primarily serve to further the
interests of the North rather than the interests of the South. If
the South is to realize significant benefits from its biodiversity,

the challenges described above must be overcome.
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V. POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE: RESTRICTION OF SUPPLY

When the United States initially refused to sign the
Biodiversity Convention in 1992, Venezuela retaliated by refusing
to sign any new scientific collaboration agreements with United
States corporations for the study of genetic resources. 173 Such
retaliation was hardly a surprise to the global community as
international environmental organizations at the Rio de Janeiro
summit had predicted such action. 17 4 Venezuela's move was by
no means the sole act of an international renegade. Since the
Convention was opened for signature, many source countries
established or made more stringent, "regulations on the collection
and export of biological resources in an effort to both control and
capture some of the [attendant] economic benefits." 17 5
In
essence, Venezuela chose to treat the Biodiversity Convention as
an international benchmark for the conduct of corporations
wishing to undertake genetic exploration within its borders,
denying access to countries that refused to accede to the
voluntary code of conduct.' 7 6
Ultimately, the United States did sign the Biodiversity
Convention, and the incident received only passing attention.
This seemingly small confrontation is extremely important,
however, because it sets crucial precedent for similar actions in
the future.17' The significance of the action is underscored by the
actor that chose to boycott United States investors: Venezuela, a
member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC).
Developing countries may seek to increase their revenue from
biodiversity prospecting by increasing the market value of their
genetic resources through supply restrictions and coercive
imposition of favorable conditions. In its least threatening form,
this could be accomplished with the voluntary cooperation of
multinational pharmaceutical corporations through creation of
codes of conduct. In the alternative, developing countries may

173.

U.S. Objections to Biodiversity Treaty Based on Misreading of the Text,

Study Says, supra note 50, at 705.
174. Gormley, supranote 13, at 161.
175. Feinsilver, supra note 2, at 22.
176. The threat was not taken lightly.

One expert observed that, "Non-

governmental organizations, governments, universities, and private corporations
will lose out when countries [restrict] access to their genetic material to only those
who signed the [C]onvention." Leak of Reilly Cable on Biodiversity Treaty Said to
Eliminate Possibility of U.S. Signature, 23 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 646 (June 12, 1992)
(quoting Russell Mittermeier, President of Conservation International).
177. See Hazarika, supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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seek to create higher market value for their genetic materials by
developing one or more genetic resource cartels.
Cartelization
and the rise of codes of conduct are not mutually exclusive
mechanisms.
They may overlap, follow one another in
progression, or act as two extreme points on a continuum. In
either case, they are a response to the enduring features of prior
approaches: the absence of an inherent market value in genetic
material, developing countries' lack of individual bargaining
power, and the absence of value-adding processes within source
countries.
The historical discussion above illustrated the reality that
multinational corporations of the North do not value biodiversity
and genetic materials per se; the countries of the South are
compensated, if at all, based upon the value added to their
resources by refinement. 178 This is an unsurprising result given
the North's historically easy access to the South's genetic
materials. As with all natural resources, the laws of supply and
demand are applicable to the cost of biological resources. When
demand remains constant but supply is restricted, the price of a
good will increase. This basic law of supply and demand can be
harnessed by the South to achieve its goals of increased revenue,
technology transfer, economic development, and improved
environmental protection. Several authors refer in passing to the
possibility of collective action to reduce supply in several contexts
related to biodiversity, 17 9 but none seriously examine the
possibility of concerted action by the South as a mechanism
through which the South can attain its goals.
Collective action by the South will fall along a continuum
from a series of isolated unilateral standards to a broad-scale
cartel that drastically restricts Northern corporations' access to
genetic resources. One scenario, voluntary multilateral regional

178. Chapela, supra note 2, at 4.
179. See Yano, supra note 36, at 486 (concluding that "[t]he most viable
alternative [to patent law for solving the narrow problem of compensation for
ethnobotanical knowledge] is the formation of monopoly contracts that would
serve the same function as patent protection"); Hamilton, supra note 28, at 645
(noting that "[o]ne direct result of contract production and industrialization [in
genetically-engineered agricultural production] may be the need for farmers to
consider collective action in negotiating fair contracts"); Kadidal, supra note 16,
at 235 ("[a] collective national property scheme involving risk-spreading among
several [developing countries] could accomplish the same goals [as patent
protection.]"); Coughlin, supra note 15, at 370 n.134 ("It might be possible for
developing countries party to the Convention to bring pressure by collectively
denying the biotechnology firms of the offending nation access to their genetic
resources. One might, however, question the viability and force of such a
maneuver. Its effectiveness might be especially curtailed if the biotechnology
firms in question already have access to sufficient genetic material under bilateral
agreements such as [Merck-INBio].").
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coordination, analogous to the U.N. Codes of Conduct,18 0 falls in
the middle of the spectrum, and probably represents the most
likely possibility. 18 1 A number of countries with gene-rich
resources might confer and formulate an agreement among
themselves.
Such an agreement would require genetic
prospectors to satisfy a series of specific conditions in exchange
for the right to collect or examine genetic samples. In the absence
of significant technology transfer, one of the conditions would
almost certainly be a royalty rate much higher than the

customary one to three percent and an up-front payment for
access to the resource. Such a condition would meet developing
countries' needs for increased revenue. Other likely conditions
include requiring the multinational corporation to locate
permanent research and development facilities within the source
country, conduct extensive scientific training of local personnel,
and transfer significant quantities of technology to the source
country. These conditions would meet the developing countries'
needs for economic development and acquisition of scientific
know-how and hardware.
Myriad contractual issues ranging from access to and use of
ethnobotanical knowledge to technology to conservation 1 82 could
be addressed in such a code. The result might be boilerplate
contractual language for use in bilateral agreements, or perhaps a
document to which multinational pharmaceutical corporations
would have to formally agree in order to gain access to any of the
signatory nations' resources. The agreement could be as broad or
as detailed as political realities would allow; it would be dictated
by what the source countries thought they could realistically
extract from potential prospectors and by the number of

180.
181.

See infra note 184.
Personal communication with Fernando Casas Castaneda, National

Coordinator of Proyecto Biopacifico, a United Nations Development Program
(U.N.D.P.) and Global Environmental Facility sponsored biodiversity project in
Colombia (July 1, 1995). Such efforts are currently underway in the Andean Pact

countries.
182. Numerous contractual issues could be addressed by a multilateral
agreement. See Rubin & Fish, supranote 17 (discussing the following contractual
clauses in the context of bilateral biodiversity prospecting agreements: rights in
inventorship, ownership of inventions, licensing, protection of intellectual
property of local plant users and indigenous peoples, and state of the art methods

for reasonably limiting the exclusivity commercial partners may seek, thereby
maximizing both present and future value of the resources. Compensation
mechanisms discussed include concession fees, extended fees, royalties,
technology transfers, and opportunities for source countries to participate in
research and development, opportunities for source countries to provide
sustainable future supplies of commercial quantities of raw and improved
material.).
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signatories and strength of the coalition. If a sufficient number of
nations signed a multilateral genetic prospecting code,
multinational corporations' access could be so restricted as to
force them to comply with the conditions of the accord. In a
worst-case scenario, all gene-rich developing countries might
flatly deny multinational corporations access to genetic resources

unless multinational corporations complied with source countries'
terms. Given that the worst-case scenario would require
unprecedented cohesive multilateral action, however, such an
extreme result seems unlikely.
Industries, such as pharmaceutical manufacturers, that were
opposed
to the Biodiversity Convention maintain
that
compensation to developing countries should be negotiated
contractually between the parties rather than by international
agreement or national legislation, which the Convention requires
on some issues.1 8 3 A code of conduct instigated by developing
countries can be seen as falling within the purview of contractual
negotiations, albeit collective negotiations confmed only by the
South's economic realities. Market factors will limit the
compensation that developing countries can realistically
demand.184 At the same time, however, collective action will
prevent nations of the South from being individually
disadvantaged when they enter bilateral negotiations with
multinational corporations. 185
Taken to the extreme, restricting supply to create valuation of
plant resources per se could result in a genetic resource cartel-a
new OPEC.
Aggressive multilateral cooperation among the
biodiversity rich nations of the developing world could potentially
starve the North of biological resources. Such cartelization would
likely start among countries who find they have little to lose by
cutting off the North's access. Countries that were promised only
a three percent royalty of sales, which may not materialize for
decades, might be willing to sign a multilateral accord that offers
the hope of realistic compensation.
There is already international precedent for multilateral
agreements that impose limitations on multinational corporations'
behavior. Although never completed, the U.N. Model Code of

Conduct for Transnational Corporations gives an illuminating
glimpse at the demands the South has made on Northern

183.
Goldman, supranote 127, at 724 n. 167.
184.
Id. at 724.
185.
In the case of the Merck-INBio negotiation, Merck's annual research
and development budget was as much as Costa Rica's annual income ($1 billion).
Leslie Roberts, Chemical Prospecting: Hopefor Vanishing Ecosystems?, SCIENCE,
May 22, 1992, at 1142.
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multinational corporations for almost two decades.1 8 6 Moreover,
Northern multinational corporations outside the pharmaceutical

For example, the Section entitled "General Principles of Behavior of
186.
Transnational Corporations" provides:

(A) Observance of local laws.
Every Member state has the right to prescribe the
(1)
conditions under which transnational corporations operate within its
national jurisdiction, subject to international law and to the international
agreements to which it has subscribed.
Each entity of a transnational corporation is subject to the
(2)
laws of the country within which it conducts its operations.
(B) Adherence to economic goals and development objectives.
Transnational corporations are subject to the national
(1)
policies, objectives and priorities for development of the host country and
shall contribute positively to carry them out.
Transnational corporations shall supply to the government
(2)
of the host country pertinent information about their activities in order to
assure that these activities are in accord with the national policies,
objectives and priorities of development of that country.
Transnational corporations shall put special emphasis on
(3)
the need of the least developed countries for the establishment of
production facilities involving a maximum utilization of local human
resources, the output of which meets identified material and social
requirements, thus assuring a convergence between local resource use
and needs as well as offering adequate employment opportunities.

Chapter III. Economic and Commercial Issues.
Ownership and Control.
A.
Member states shall have the right to permanent
(1)
sovereignty over their natural wealth, and resources shall be used in the
interests of their national development.
Transnational corporations shall be subject to the exercise
(2)
by the host country of permanent sovereignty over all its wealth, natural
resources, and economic activities.
Terms of admission and operation.
Prior authorization by the competent national authorities
(1)
may be required for all inward foreign direct investment or acquisition of
existing undertakings by transnational corporations.
Each Member state may reserve sectors of economic activity
(2)
B.

for national, public or private enterprise and has the right to determine
whether the participation of mixed enterprises in these sectors shall be
admitted.

Transfer of Technology.
Transnational corporations shall endeavor to ensure that
(1)
their activities fit satisfactorily into the scientific and technological policies
and plans of the host country, and contribute to the development of its
national scientific and technological capabilities, including, as far as
H.
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industry regularly develop their own codes of conduct. The codes
are usually specific to a given industry and are association-based,
applying both within the United States and, to some extent,
internationally.1 8 7 Such codes are often environmental, but
address more visibly pressing concerns, such as hazardous
materials.
Private codes are proliferating throughout the
developed world, creating a universe of voluntary commitments to
188
better environmental practices by multinational corporations.

appropriate, the establishment and improvement of the host country's
capacity to innovate.
(2)
Transnational corporations shall to the fullest extent
practicable, adopt, in the course of their business activities, practices
which permit the rapid diffusion of technologies with due regard to the
protection of industrial and intellectual property rights.
(3)
Transnational corporations shall, when granted licenses for
the use of property rights, or when otherwise transfering technology,
consider that developing countries regard transfer of technology as an
indispensable means for promoting and accelerating their economic
development and shall do so on reasonable terms and conditions.
(4)
Transnational corporations shall take all practicable
measures for creating an environment conducive to the strengthening of
the technological capacity of countries, including encouraging universities
and other research and training institutes to create special technological
programs for the nationals of the host country, expanding their own
respective research and development activities which can be of benefit to
the host country and supporting the establishment of a network of
research and development institutions such as the United Nations
University.

K.

Environmental protection.
(1)
The protection, preservation, and enhancement of the
environment is the responsibility of all countries. All Member states shall
endeavor to establish their own environmental and developmental policies
in conformity with such responsibility. All Member states have the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control

do not cause damage to the environment of other countries or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. All countries should cooperate in
evolving international norms and regulations in the field of the
environment.
(2)
Transnational corporations shall give due consideration to
the aims and priorities of host countries regarding the protection,
preservation, and enhancement of the environment.
MODEL CODE OF CONDUcT FOR TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS (Draft 1977) (World
Peace Through Law Center).
See also Informal Proposalsto Resolve Differences, U.N. CHRON., May 1983, at
65 (discussing negotiations on the Model Code); Robert Grosse, Codes of Conduct
for MultinationalEnterprises, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 414, 419-26 (comparing the
provisions of nine existing model codes on multinational corporations).
187. See Michael S. Baram, Multinational Corporations,Private Codes, and
Technology Transferfor SustainableDevelopment, 24 ENVTL. L. 33, 55 (1994).
188. Id. at 54.
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Significantly, however, even the most conscientious corporations
almost never adhere to their codes of conduct in relations with
developing countries. 189
Domestic regulatory policy within the United States is also
moving toward voluntary compliance. The system is being
redesigned to stimulate voluntary corporate initiatives and to

reward or punish companies on the basis of the policies and
management practices they adopt. 19 0 Taken in the aggregate,
there appears to be a pervasive movement toward constructing
mechanisms that induce multinational corporations to comply
voluntarily with environmental requirements.
The most well-known precedent relevant to this discussion is,
of course, the creation of the OPEC oil cartel and its control on
global oil supplies in the early 1970s. In the OPEC context, access
to a natural resource took on the political cast of a battle between
countries of the North and South, as oil exporting nations sought
to demonstrate and solidify a fundamental political recognition of
their national sovereignty. 19 1
Individual nations are already beginning to coordinate
restricted access to their genetic resources. The Venezuelan and
Indian position discussed previously are not the only examples of
movements which threaten to tighten the supply of genetic
resources. The presidents of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama signed a
nonbinding resolution that encouraged the passage of internal
laws to regulate the extraction of medicinal plants and other biogenetic substances. 19 2 The next logical step is for them to create
an enforcement mechanism which will make such pro-restriction
resolutions binding.
A cartel effort would be built upon the platform of shared
perceptions that underpins the label "South," which when
properly used, refers to an observable process in international
politics. 193 The "bloc diplomatic behavior" exhibited by nations of
the South, especially when they are represented by the Group of

189. See id. at 54-55 (discussing different types of multinational
corporations and the voluntary codes of conduct they have adopted).

190.

d. at51.

191. See Joseph Stanislaw & Daniel Yergin, Oil: Reopening the Door, 72
FOREIGN AFF. 81, 82-84 (Sept./Oct. 1993) (reexamining the early 1970's oil crisis
and its underlying causes).
192. Central American Presidents Resolve to Pass Laws Restricting Use of
Resources, 15 Int'l Envt. Rep. (BNA) 397, 397 (June 11, 1992).
193. Hanson, supra note 3, at 1105-06.
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77 (the Nonaligned Movement), 194 is underpinned by several
fundamental shared perceptions:
(1) Status quo institutional
structures (particularly GATT and the International Monetary
Fund) and attendant political and economic processes are deeply

biased against developing countries; (2) the North has constructed
a system of international impediments to the South's economic
growth; and (3) Southern nations share the goal of achieving
higher levels of political influence and economic welfare in
international relations. 19s
If the ties which bind the South into a cohesive political
entity are not strong enough to support a unitary cartel effort,
then cartelization may occur along regional lines drawn for other
purposes. In South America, for example, the nations of the
Andean Common Market 19 6 have cooperated with each other in
creating a draft framework for access to genetic resources.197
19
Similarly, the nations that participated in the Contadora s
process of the mid-1980s could be expected to become an early
focal point for collective efforts to reduce the North's access to
biological resources.
However, multinational pharmaceutical
corporations will prefer to keep their options open and acquire
genetic
samples
from
nunierous
geographic
locations,
institutions, and collection agencies. 199 If too many regional
cartels develop, their effectiveness will be compromised. Thus,
various cartels can be expected to coordinate with one another for
maximum effectiveness.
The potential financial benefits of cartelization are not
without some risk. One risk of cartelization is that the Northern
multinational corporations might play a long waiting-game,
gambling that the South's immediate financial needs are so
pressing that individual nations will break the united front in
order to fulfill their needs for revenue. This is especially likely

194.
See Jonathan I. Chamey, Entry Into Force of the 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 381, 400 n.104 (1995). The Group of 77 (the

nonaligned states) now consists of over 122 developed countries. David L.
Larson, Deep Seabed Mining: Definition of the Problem, 17 Ocean Dev. & Intl L,
No. 4, 271, 272 (1986). See also Resolutions of the Conference of Heads of States
or Government of the Nonaligned Countries, 7th Session (Luanda, 1985).
195.
Id. at 1105-08.
196.
See Grosse, supra note 185, at 419-26 (comparing the provisions of
nine existing model codes on multinational corporations and discussing the
Andean Common Market's efforts to control the actions of multinational
corporations operating within their borders).
197.
Personal communication with Fernando Casas Casteneda, supra note
180.
198.
See generally Tom J. Farer, Contadora: The Hidden Agenda, 59
FOREIGN POLY 59 (Summer 1985) (discussing the Contadora's process in the
context of Central American politics in the 1980s).
199.
Feinsilver, supranote 2, at 43.
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with the growing prominence of a combinatorial chemistry, 2° °
which is capable of producing millions of compounds in a short
time for testing in high-throughput screening systems. This,
undoubtedly, will reduce the demand for natural products as the
starting materials for drug discovery screening. 20 1
Such a
strategy would cut off a large portion of the cartel members'
revenue from biodiversity prospecting for several years.
A second risk is that the governments of the North might play
political hardball on economic issues of greater importance to the
South, such as loan rescheduling and various other forms of
trade treatment. These risks seem unlikely, however, because the
United States cherishes its position as the global biotechnology
leader, and United States companies desire the South's resources
2 2
at least as much as source countries wish to allow the access. 0
The history of OPEC amply demonstrates a third risk:
factionalization within the cartel itself. Bilateral. disagreements
within a large cartel may be a never-ending threat to the harmony
of the group and its ability to remain cohesive for the greater
benefit of all involved. This fact suggests that a series of smaller
regional cartels would be more likely to achieve the South's
objectives than one large cartel. Multinational corporations could
certainly attempt to manipulate internal tensions in an effort to
weaken the cartel's control of accessible genetic resources by
playing one member off another.
A fourth risk is that the North might attempt to sanction
Southern cartel members for restricting access to their resources
in violation of the Biodiversity Convention.2 0 3 However, if the
North fails to honor its Convention duty to provide technology

transfer, technical and scientific cooperation, and financial
resources,2 ° 4 the South will be able to justifiably evade its
Convention obligation to provide access.
The Convention

200. Combinatorial chemistry refers to the synthetic production of millions
of peptides from a block set of 20 standard amino acids using recombinant
systems such as bacteriophage.
201. Personal communication with Gordon M. Cragg, Ph.D., Chief, Natural
Products Branch, National Cancer Institute (Aug. 17, 1995). Dr. Cragg presents
the widely held counterargument that while combinatorial chemistry has the
power to very quickly create millions of analogues to a set of starting materials, it
lacks nature's ingenuity for creating true diversity.
202. Coughlin, supra note 15, at 370.
203. Article 15 (2) states: "Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to create
conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources for environmentally sound uses
by other Contracting Parties and not to impose restrictions that run counter to
the objectives of this Convention." Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, art.
15(2).
204. Id. arts. 16, 18, 20 respectively.
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recognizes that developing countries' duty to provide access is
20 5
conditioned upon ample support from developed countries.
It is not clear from the Convention to what degree the South
could restrict access and still be in compliance.
The
interpretation of "access" may ultimately be quite loose. The
majority of signatories are nations of the South and, as they ratify
the Convention, their enabling domestic legislation will almost
certainly adopt a broad interpretation of their powers to provide
and restrict access. The Convention frequently uses the phrases
"mutually agreeable terms" and "subject to mutual agreement"
when discussing access, 2 °6 and this could provide an escape
clause for cartel members. Presently, Northern corporations can
argue that their bilateral contracts with developing countries
constitute "mutually agreed terms" despite the multinational
corporations' strong bargaining power. Conversely, the phrase
"mutually agreed terms" could be construed to allow the nations
of the South to drive an extremely hard bargain with the North by
threatening restricted access to genetic resources. A final risk is
that attempts to control the flow of biological materials could
result in black market smuggling of raw genetic materials; a
market and infrastructure already exists.
Some commentators feel that the Biodiversity Convention is
too vague to have any real adverse impact on the North's goal of
preserving intellectual property rights. 2 °7 If the Convention is so
weak as not to harm the North, it may also be too vague to help
the South achieve its goals of increased benefit sharing and
technology transfer. Moreover, the Convention was the product of
agreement among governments, not institutions.
It is
institutions, such as multinational corporations, which hold

much of the money, knowledge, and technology that developing
countries need.
There is significant risk that the South's
disillusionment with the North's economic and political tactics
will continue to grow. If enough Southern countries become
sufficiently frustrated with a continued lack of compensation and
technology transfer, cartelization cannot be ruled out.
Cartelization is a readily available mechanism that offers the
South a measure of control and self-determination currently
absent from its dealings with the North. Because the South
currently receives so few benefits from status quo biodiversity
prospecting agreements, countries of the South have little to lose,
and much to gain, by cooperating to restrict the North's access to
genetic resources.

205.
206.
207.

Chapela, supranote 2, at 13-14.
See, e.g., arts. 15(4) and (7), 16(2) and (3), 18(5), 19(2).
Coughlin, supra note 15, at 354 n.81.
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VI. NECESSARY ALTERNATIVES:
NEW ENTERPRISES AND CONVENTION COMPLIANCE

The primary goal of the Biodiversity Convention is to engage
the world community in activities that will preserve, or at least
not further destroy, the world's biological wealth. 20 8
Not
surprisingly, most of the destruction of biological diversity is
occurring in the developing world. The reason is that in the
developing world there are often few economically viable
alternatives to destructive uses of biodiversity. If a peasant in the
Colombian Amazon is given the opportunity to make a living in an
"environmentally friendly" manner, he will no longer have the
need to fell trees to feed his family.
Biodiversity prospecting is potentially one of these
"environmentally friendly" alternatives. It is theorized that local
communities (e.g., peasants or indigenous persons) in developing
countries could engage in the collection and preliminary
identification of useful plants for a biodiversity prospecting
project. This is already being done on a small scale through
INBio's parataxonomist program.2 0 9 But parataxomonists alone
will not save the world's disappearing biodiversity, and the
limitations of the INBio model have already been discussed supra.
In countries with rich endowments of biological diversity, such as
Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, and Bolivia, economic alternatives to
destructive uses of biodiversity must be created.
Today, developing countries with rich biological endowments
A
are almost universally considered "biodiversity providers."

company or institution desirous of a developing country's
biodiversity can simply pay collectors or source country
2 10

institutions a fee for providing them with natural products.
Although this is slowly changing, some view this type of payment
But, as with parataxonomists,
as "equitable compensation."
collection fees alone will not save the world's biodiversity.
Unfortunately, all four biodiversity prospecting initiatives
described in Part IV essentially limit a developing country's
participation to playing the role of a "biodiversity provider." In all
four models, the major value-adding activities are performed
outside the source country. These activities include fractionation,
screening, structural elucidation, advanced in vitro studies, and in

208. Biodiversity Convention, supranote 1, art. 1.
209. See Daniel H. Janzen et al., The Role of Parataxonomists,Inventory
Managers, and Taxanomists in Costa Rica's National Biodiversity Inventory, in
BIODIVERSITY PROSPECIING, supranote 49, at 223.
210. Asebey, New Model, supranote 38, at 4.
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vivo studies. Consequently, it will be difficult for developing
countries to receive more than 0.2-3%211 in royalties. With this
low level of return, a developing country's initiatives to preserve
biodiversity will almost certainly be unable to compete
economically with the lucrative, but more destructive, alternatives
already available. These alternatives include fulfilling consumer
2 12
demand for precious wood, meat, and soybeans.
If the objectives of the Biodiversity Convention are to be
fulfilled, the signatories of the developed North must begin to view
their counterparts in the developing South not simply as cheap
providers of genetic resources, but as partners in a global effort to
use biodiversity responsibly. In essence, this is the Biodiversity
Convention's mandate. Until developing countries can capture a
meaningful amount of the benefits from their biodiversity,
biodiversity prospecting will not be linked to conservation or
sustainable development in any meaningful way.
Until a
developing country can economically benefit from its biodiversity,
there will be no significant incentive to protect it from destruction.*
The first step in assuring that a developing country can
capture more of its biodiversity's value is to transfer appropriate
technologies, including fractionation technology, screening
technology, and know-how.
This can be accomplished by
coordinating the activities of source countries' nongovernmental
organizations, scientific institutions, and local and indigenous
communities. By actively engaging source country entities in
more of the value-adding steps2 13 of biodiversity prospecting, a

greater share of the benefits can be justifiably returned to the
source country. Although transferring technology implies that
developed world pharmaceutical interests would eventually need
to share royalties with their developing world partners, it is a
small price to pay for preserving the world's rich sources of
biological diversity. Such a true partnership approach can assure
industrial interests continued access to biodiversity while
simultaneously creating an economic incentive for the
preservation of biodiversity.
As previously discussed, the underlying problem of
biodiversity prospecting is the problem of valuation of genetic
resources.
Cartelization attempts to address the valuation
problem by forcing a front-end increase in the value of natural

211.

These figures are the composite of 0.2%-1% from the RAFI report and

the estimated 1-3% of the INBio-Merck agreement, discussed supra notes 112
and 115 and accompanying text.
212. WORLD RESOURcES INSITuFE ET AL., GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY STRATEGY 1
(1992).
213. Examples of value-adding steps include advanced screening,
structural elucidation of compounds, and clinical development.
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products before they are screened for bioactivity. The necessary
alternative to the valuation problem is to change the amount of
value-adding performed in developing countries. At present,
developing source countries are in a dilemma because they are
short of funds. They seek to develop the in-country scientific and
technological capacity that will yield profits, yet such capacitybuilding requires a significant financial expenditure. At base,
drug discovery hinges on exportable biological information and
human resources,2 14 and development of both of these requires
an initial capital investment. In the wake of the Biodiversity
Convention, it may now be possible for developing countries to
break out of the old cycle with the appearance of a different kind
of biodiversity prospecting enterprise.
To date, the existing players on the biodiversity prospecting
scene have seldom pursued goals that are compatible with those
of the developing source countries.2 1 5 So long as the North
pursues its goals through these entities, the goals of source
countries will remain unsatisfied. Each of these initiatives adds
compliance with the Convention as a gloss upon the goals it was
already pursuing. The solution is to create a new type of
biodiversity enterprise which will make compliance with the goals
of the Biodiversity Convention a guiding principle. This guiding
principle will then lead enterprises to cross-institutional

collaboration, technology transfer, creation of original knowledge,

and flow of capital back to the source country.2 16 It also will lead
to direct contact between industry and indigenous communities
(suggested by the Shaman experience), direct and active

214.

Chapela, supra note 2, at 2.

Source countries seek to generate revenue, develop a form of valuation
215.
that provides a workable basis for policy decisions, and build their scientific and
technological capacity. Indigenous communities within the source countries have
slightly different yet compatible goals: They seek to ensure their survival and to
balance the overlapping goals of conservation and economic development. In
contrast, multinational pharmaceutical companies, biotech companies, academic
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) hold goals of their own,
which are incompatible with the source country's needs. Pharmaceutical

companies, seek to increase their profits and, as a result, to increase their
Venture capitalists, the traditional supports of
shareholders' wealth.
biotechnology companies, seek short-term profits. Organizations run by the
international academic community seek scientific progress and the advancement
of pure knowledge. NGOs' goals vary widely, but tend to be purely technical. Id.
at 37, tbl. 1.
216. Chapela, supra note 2, at 7. These desirable traits are inferred from
the case study of a Mexican corporation, Syntex, that achieved unprecedented
success in the development of a new drug in the 1960s, despite the tremendous
advantages of existing multinational pharmaceutical corporations. Id.
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by the
involvement of the source country government (suggested
2 17
INBio experience), and feedback from the market.
These new biodiversity enterprises will require strong support
from source country governments in securing capital, ensuring a
favorable or even preferential domestic regulatory environment,
facilitating passage through layers of domestic bureaucracy,
protecting against possible predatory behavior of multinational
pharmaceutical companies, and generally creating an overall
atmosphere conducive to the needs of a new biodiversity
prospecting industry.

218

Moreover, new biodiversity enterprises

will need the support of an unusual combination of financing
mechanisms, both public and private. 2 19 The enterprises may
turn to any number of nonprofit organizations for grants or even
distributions of United States foreign aid, 2 20 and also to large
foreign firms with environmental interests or major environmental
organizations that keep a low profile. 2 2 1 The new enterprises will
also be able to apply to the funding mechanisms created by the
Biodiversity Convention itself.22 2 Finally, the United Nations and

217. Id.
218.
Feinsilver, supranote 2, at 49. Bioprospecting works best as part of a
broader plan for economic development and environmental preservation
(sustainable development). High-level governmental support is greatly desirable,

preferably a high-level official at the ministerial level to formulate policy, oversee
programs, and create mutually reinforcing institutional arrangements. Id.
219. As discussed in the section on Shaman Pharmaceuticals, supra Part
IV.D., United States venture capital is not a viable funding source for the new
biodiversity enterprises.
220.
Some nonprofit organizations that may support such initiatives
include:
the Mott Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Rockefeller
Foundation, the Pew Charitable Trusts, and the Institute for Sustainable
Communities.
United States foreign aid is channeled through many
nongovernmental sources, including the American Bar Association's Central and
East European Law Initiative.
221.
See Feinsilver, supra note 2, at 52 (referring in passing to such
evolving funding sources).
222. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, arts. 20, 21. The Convention
requires, inter alia,that:
Each Contracting Party undertakes to provide, in accordance with its
capabilities, financial support and incentives .... The developed country
Parties shall provide new and additional financial resources to enable
developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs to
them of implementing measures which fulfill the obligations of this
Convention and to benefit from its provisions.... Other Parties... may
voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties ....
Contributions from other countries and sources on a voluntary basis
would also be encouraged. . . . Developed country Parties may also
provide . . . financial resources related to the implementation of this
Convention through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels.
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World Bank may create additional financial resources that are
conditioned upon demonstrable compliance with the Biodiversity
Convention.
While capital is being raised, the new enterprises should
build ties to the indigenous communities where natural products
collections will be conducted 2 23 and develop working relationships
with source country organizations that possess useful knowledge
and resources. The latter type of contact may ultimately result in
a partnership with a private entity inside the source country.
Because the in-country partners would have an equity stake in
the joint venture, their assumption of some risk and
responsibility will lead to greater opportunities for technology
transfer and to a greater share of the profits for the source
22 4
country.
Once the new biodiversity prospecting enterprise is
operational, the source country will realize increasing benefits.
Local citizens will need to conduct daily operations, thus resulting
in income to the community and increased scientific literacy. As
additional scientists are attracted to the enterprise, the source
country's scientific and technological capacity will grow. As the
enterprise expands, it will purchase high-tech equipment and
continue to build local capacity. Biotechnology development uses
standardized technologies that can be used in a wide variety of
research, agricultural, and industrial applications. 2 25 Thus,
citizens trained to use instruments or procedures in a
pharmaceutical context will also be able to work with them in
another sector of the country's economy, thereby increasing the
source country's technological capability.
The biodiversity
enterprise will help prepare the source country's scientific
workforce for the challenges of the 21st century. 22 6 In addition,
the enterprise will generate revenue for the source country and
contribute to the protection of the environment.
Under the Biodiversity Convention, countries are required to
inventory their biodiversity. 2 2 7
At a minimum, the new
biodiversity enterprises could develop reliable, high quality
collection and extraction capabilities. These tasks are not highly

223.
Some communities have already been approached by Shaman, INBio,
the National Cancer Institute, and participants in the International Cooperative
Biodiversity Groups. A start-up enterprise will be able to follow their example in
this area.
224.
Feinsilver, supranote 2, at 44-45.
225.
Id. at 51.
226.
Id
227.
Biodiversity Convention, supranote 1, art. 7.
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228
sophisticated, yet training and considerable care are necessary.
In an effort to control their genetic resources, build scientific
capacity, and create value-added biodiversity, some source
countries recently banned collection by traditional intermediaries,
such as botanical gardens.2 2 9
Some of these countries are
already working to develop scientific institutions capable of
23 0
collection and extraction, and later possibly initial screening.
Even if the biodiversity enterprise continues to remain
essentially an intermediary between collectors and multinational
pharmaceutical companies and does not progress beyond
collection, labeling, and elementary chemical analysis, the
enterprise will still create significant benefits for the source
country. The country's genetic resources and samples will no
longer be merely a "black box," waiting to be opened by
multinational pharmaceutical companies. Instead, the source
country will be able to deliver an organism or extract with
23 1
informed knowledge about its real chemical potential.
If the new biodiversity prospecting enterprise moves beyond
the function of channeling genetic materials to multinational
pharmaceutical corporations, it must develop and profit from a
new drug. Drug discovery is high risk. In the United States, only
one of every 80,000 to 250,000 substances screened reaches the
drug market. 2 32 However, the chances for lucrative operations
may be markedly. better in the developing world because Northern
multinational pharmaceutical companies confine themselves to a
narrow section of the pharmaceutical market: the search for bigticket treatments for the ailments that are of most concern to
developed nations. 23 3
They generally ignore the diseases

indigenous to developing source countries and do not create
screens that would identify natural products to treat those local
diseases. 2 3 There is a particularly urgent need to screen natural
products for a wide range of tropical infectious and chronic
235
diseases.
Plant-derived pharmaceuticals developed in a source country
and marketed to other developing countries face a much less
restrictive regulatory environment than those developed in the

228. Feinsilver, supranote 2, at 52.
229. Id. at 24.
230. 1&
231. Chapela, supra note 2, at 26.
232. Feinsilver, supranote 2, at 33-34.
233. Cancer and AIDS are two of the most visible "big ticket" undertakings.
They are high-risk, involve a large market, and offer potentially enormous profits.
234. Feinsilver, supra note 2, at 51-52.
235. Id. at 49.
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United States.23 6 Less regulation means that drugs can be
brought to market faster and generate revenue earlier. Thus, the
new biodiversity enterprise could produce scientifically validated
and standardized herbal remedies to meet the primary health care
needs of the developing world, as well as some European
countries in which these phytopharmaceuticals and herbal
remedies are common. 23 7
Such advancements would occur
within the confines of a market niche not challenged by
multinational pharmaceutical companies. Simultaneously, the
new enterprise could compete more directly with multinational
pharmaceutical companies in seeking to find a cure for the
diseases of the developed world. In either case, because more
value-adding would occur inside the developing country, a larger
share of profits could remain in the source country. If a new
enterprise is highly successful, it may be in danger of being
"vertically integrated" into a pre-existing
multinational
pharmaceutical company. 23 8 Vertical integration causes profits to
be retained by the parent multinational company, which in turn
exports profits out of the source country. Strong collaboration
between the new enterprises and the source countries in which
they operate is necessary in order to combat vertical integration.
In the future, groups of new enterprises may also attempt to
cooperate with one another. Various developing countries have
complementary assets that could synergize if national interests
were subordinated to regional considerations.2 3 9 Development of
scientific capacity is not beyond the reach of many developing
countries and could be done in either federal or multinational
research and development consortia. 24 0 Regional coordination

efforts might complement each other and lead to regional

competitiveness in the global market. 2 4 1 In the absence of
positive incentives, opportunities and human resources will
continue to be drained out of developing countries and will flow
42
toward established industry in the North.2
In summary, technology transfer performed in the context of
a Convention-driven bioprospecting company offers developing
countries the chance to increase their revenue and technological

236.

Id. at 48.

237.

Id. at 49.

238.
See Chapela, supra note 2, at 6-8 (describing how this fate befell an
earlier Mexican start-up company, which developed a treatment for hormonal
imbalances in the 1940s from a Mexican tuber, dioscoreamexicana).
239. Id. at 23.
240. Feinsilver, supranote 2, at 5 1.
241. Chapela, supranote 2, at 2.
242. Id. at 23.
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basis by creating the capacity to perform value-adding
processes.243 Rather than increasing revenue at the front end of
the bioprospecting process by raising the cost of raw genetic
material to developers through supply restrictions, the
Convention-driven enterprises will train source country citizens
and retain a greater portion of profits within the source country.
The net result will be the linkage between conservation and
sustainable development through the creation of an economically
sustainable biodiversity-based industry, which is an effective
alternative to destructive uses of biodiversity.
VII. CONCLUSION

This Article examined the development of North-South
biodiversity prospecting and critiqued the major initiatives that
were undertaken in response to the Convention on Biological
Diversity. This Article concludes that existing models do not meet
the goals of the Convention. The future of United States
biodiversity prospecting may depend upon whether the United
States ratifies the Biodiversity Convention. If it does not ratify,
the South can be expected to restrict the United States access to
the South's genetic resources. Whether or not the United States
ratifies the Convention, a new type of business enterprise may
develop that uses compliance with the Biodiversity Convention as
a guiding corporate principle. Such an enterprise would be the
first mechanism to comply with both the spirit and substance of
the Biodiversity Convention.

243. For an example of the "Convention-driven bioprospecting enterprise"
see Feinsilver, supra note 2, at 43-45, 48 (contrasting Washington D.C.-based
Andes Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and other bioprospecting initiatives) and Asebey,
supra note 38, generally (describing the mission of Andes Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in
relation to the Biodiversity Convention).

